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Chapter 1 
1.0 Introduction 
The Muslim Brotherhood has been an active element of Egyptian political life 
since its founding in 1928 by school teacher Hassan al-Banna. The Muslim 
Brotherhood, also known as al-lkhwan al-Muslimun, has helped shape Egypt’s 
political scene for decades. The Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology is popular with the 
masses and contributes to its strength as a grassroots movement. It is also the largest 
and most influential Islamist group in the Arab region due to its years of political and 
charitable participation which started in the Egyptian society and then branched to the 
Arab region. The Muslim Brotherhood’s philosophical foundations reflect the 
thinking of its founder, Hassan al-Banna, whose firm devotion to the Qur'an and the 
Sunnah resulted in his finding of the society of Muslim Brothers with the initial goal 
of mass education on matters such as the Sunna and Quran. Hassan al-Banna 
observed immorality during the colonial era as a result of the actions of the British 
soldiers in Ismailya such as prostitution and alcohol which affected the view of al-
Banna and led his call for the end of colonialism. Al-Banna commented saying, “I 
believe that my people, because of the political stages which they have passed 
through them, and under the impact of western civilization… materialist philosophy 
and franji traditions, have departed from the goals of their faith” (Mitchell, 6). These 
observations of society under British rule resulted in his decision to create a group 
dedicated to leading people back to their faith through counseling. This group was 
created as a reaction to the developments al-Banna observed in society, which makes 
it a reactionary movement.  
 Its initial involvement in contemporary politics was observed in the interwar 
period where they organized demonstrations against colonial rule in Egypt. Another 
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issue the Brotherhood was deeply involved in during the interwar period was the issue 
of Palestine. The Brotherhood organized efforts to raise funds to support the Arab 
Strike in Palestine (Mitchell, 17). The Muslim Brotherhood’s participation was also 
observed in the 1952 Revolution, where they participated with President Gamal Abdel 
Nasser to over throw the monarchy. The Brotherhood supported Nasser through 
mobilizing protests in support of Nasser and the coup. The Brotherhood also tried to 
participate in the state in the post-coup Egypt, but was ultimately sidelined by the 
regime. After an attempt to assassinate Nasser, which would later be blamed at the 
Brotherhood, the populist president banned the group, imprisoning and persecuting 
and tortured many of its members such as Sayid Qutb. The group became banned 
under Nasser and continued to be banned during the era of his successor President 
Anwar Sadat, at first he continued the brutal policies of his successor, although he 
gradually eased the restrictions placed on the group by freeing some from prison and 
by allowing the group to resume its activities despite still being illegal. One of the 
members which were jailed, Sayid Qutb and would write a book transforming the 
ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood; his book called for jihad against rulers because 
of their corruption. This group, which supported violence, would splinter away from 
the Muslim Brotherhood and influence jihadists for generations to come.  After Sadat 
signed the Camp David Accords, the Muslim Brothers would soon find themselves 
involved in paramilitary activities in which a group would successfully assassinate 
him. These politically oriented paramilitary activities lead President Hosni Mubarak 
to revert to the tactics of Nasser to help be rid of the Muslim Brotherhood. Mubarak, 
using legal tools, such as the state of emergency kept a tight rein on the political and 
charitable activities of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The mass popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood would threaten the regimes of 
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Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak and eventually lead to the Brotherhood maintaining its 
illegal status, its members being persecuted and forcing them into the underground. In 
its operations as an underground movement, the Brotherhood was able to build a solid 
network of charitable institutions that dually functioned as a political apparatus. Its 
popularity, due to its continuous participation in social charity, created wide appeal in 
the impoverished class who were ignored by the government, solidifying its status as 
the most organized grassroots movements. Its continuous participation in the social 
sphere and running in elections as independent candidates made impossible for 
authoritarian regimes to completely eradicate despite their best efforts (Filiu, 98).  
The Muslim Brotherhood was more than just a socio-political movement, it 
was “a political organization, an athletic group, acultural-educational union, an 
economic company, and a socialidea” (Mitchell, 14). The lack of, what is in their 
view as the proper application Islam in state, has caused them to continuously try to 
rebel against the state.  As a result of years of authoritarianism, mass demonstrations 
from all segments in society succeeded in toppling the Mubarak regime in 18 days. 
Despite their initial reservations to participating in the mass demonstrations, the 
Muslim Brotherhood significantly to the success of the January 25 Revolution and to 
subsequent state building initiatives.While no one movement can claim to be the 
cause behind the 2011 Revolution, several movements, including the Muslim 
Brotherhood, compiled their efforts, and put aside their ideological differences in 
order to get rid of Mubarak’s authoritarian regime. The initial 18 days of the Egyptian 
Revolution brought together young liberal protesters and the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and this unlikely alliance was believed by many at the time to be the result of the Arab 
Spring, having inspired likeminded demonstrators in neighbouring countries such as 
Syria and Libya to stage their own protests (New York Times, 6). Due to the Muslim 
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Brotherhood being the “largest and most sustained opposition movement” (Brown, 
207),with an unmatched ability to organize its followers to support a given agenda, 
were in the position to take advantage of the power vacuum take hold of power, the 
final aspiration for a revolutionary organization (Sharp, 20).  
 This study will look into how the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood since 
its establishment has affected its recent political activities. In particular, the thesis will 
analyze the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood under Mubarak’s regime so as to 
explain its eventual political success in the post Mubarak Egypt as well as its eventual 
failures in institution building in the post January 2011 Egypt. It is my contention that 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s state building initiatives are employing the same 
authoritarian tools used by Mubarak. This work will attempt to add to the existing 
literature about the Muslim Brotherhood by exploring how despite the experiences 
gained by the group in organizing social services for masses and by their experience 
as opposition which ultimately caused their rise to power are also caused their 
mistakes in state building and their eventual ouster. 
 This thesis adopts a comparative approach, as well as examining the 
retrospective and prospective political aspirations of the group. The comparative 
approach will be used in order to compare the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood 
from before the January 2011 Revolution with their actions after the January 2011 
Revolution in order to establish common characteristics in their approach to state and 
society. The research method will involve a critical assessment of their decisions to 
understand their application of their ideology in a modern state. First, a literature 
review will be presented to provide a view of the different scholarly works and their 
opinions about the Muslim Brotherhood and the different analysis of the players, 
principles, and political circumstances, during the period preceding the January 25 
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Revolution and which eventually led to the Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing, the 
Freedom and Justice Party, to rise to power. This will then be followed by a 
presentation of the Egyptian case study and the Muslim Brotherhood experience 
through the use of specific events during the 25th of January Revolution and the 
transitional phase, which will help demonstrate the hypotheses that the Muslim 
Brotherhood had a significant role, that it subsequently used Mubarak’s method to 
hold on to power, and that the internal characteristics which untimely caused their rise 
to power also caused their mistakes in state building and the rise of opposition.  
 The Muslim Brotherhood movement falls under the umbrella of the political 
Islam theory and whose movements which have been given a chance at state rule as a 
result of the Arab Spring. The events of the Arab Spring have affected the Muslim 
Brotherhood movement by giving them the opportunity to actually implement their 
ideology at a state level. It is important to clarify that the events in Egypt did not 
happen in a vacuum. The Muslim Brotherhood, while a movement that started in 
Egypt, it has expanded beyond the Egyptian state. This study will also look into the 
methods of political participation which the Muslim Brotherhood practiced under the 
different regimes in Egypt.  
During the 18 day Egyptian Revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood endeavoured 
to avoid the limelight but observers noted that it was “seizing the political 
momentum” (Trager, 114). Since their rise to power, the Muslim Brotherhood has 
used their political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, in order to promote their 
political goals. It has publically accepted that democracy is the form of government 
they which to implement and denounced violence, which serves as an indication to 
the ideological evolution of the group. One of its expressed goals is the creation of a 
nation governed by Islamic law, or Sharia (Ramadan) but this has been a point of 
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criticism due to the various interpretations of Islamic law and the complications. Yet 
despite the evolution of the group, they ultimately commit the same mistakes of the 
Mubarak regime and result in their own demise in the June 30th Uprising.  
 
1.1 Research Question 
 This research seeks to answer to explore the question of the role of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the 2011 Revolution. Through this question this study will explore 
how the Muslim Brotherhood came about this role through exploring the internal and 
external characteristics of the Muslim Brotherhood. This question will be answered 
by exploring the roots of the Muslim Brotherhood, how it became involved in 
Egyptian politics as well as to identify the sources of its political strength by 
exploring their role, this paper will assess how the Muslim Brotherhood acted in the 
crucial days of the revolution to validate its principles, assess its path and eventually 
start their rise to power.  With the Muslim Brotherhood being the largest, most 
organized opposition group in Egypt, it has the necessary numbers to influence events 
through the power to mobilize, which was observed in the initial 18 days of the 
revolution. 
In order to better understand the Egyptian revolution, looking into the internal 
dynamics and the different ideologies represented in the different players participating 
is essential. It is important to emphasize that the Muslim Brotherhood has had a great 
role in Egypt from before the 2011 Revolution as it helped shape many of Nasser, 
Sadat, and Mubarak’s policies as well as becoming a tool for these authoritarian rulers 
to convince citizens of the validity of these authoritarian policies. An indicator of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s popularity which they used in mobilization is their rising 
numbers, by the late 1940s “had over two thousand branches throughout Egypt 
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and between 300,000 and 600,000 active members-the largest organized force in the 
country” (Munson) and continues to increase as the organization expands to a global 
organization. Sometime after its disbandment in 1948, the group had allegedly 
masterminded the assassination of Prime Minister Mahmoud al-Nuqrashi. Al-Banna 
who was implicated in the assassination by virtue of being the founder of the 
Brotherhood, condemned the killing, and was in turn assassinated by an unknown 
gunman; allegedly a member of the government’s security forces (Mitchell, 68). The 
assassination of al-Nuqrashi caused backlash amongst the supporters of al-Nuqrashi 
who protested demanding the “death of Hassan al-Banna” (Mitchell, 67).  This trend 
of using the Muslim Brotherhood in order to create an image of an enemy is a trend 
that is used by authoritarian rulers.  Through exploring these tactics this paper seeks 
to expand on a study in political science which is the actions of authoritarian rules in 
order to maintain power. After the assassination of al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood 
was able to work with Nasser in 1948 through mobilizing people to support the coup 
d'état. It was because the Muslim Brotherhood was tied to an unsuccessful attempt to 
assassinate President Gamal Abdul Nasser that caused Nasser to turn against the 
group which had initially requested to help in the initial state building stages of the 
1952 Revolution (Bajoria para 2). Muslim Brotherhood members were imprisoned by 
Nasser which demonstrates how authoritarian rulers can use the opposition for their 
own advantage. Later on, a splinter group was implicated in the assassination of 
President Anwar al-Sadat, making legal recognition for the group impossible. Since 
then, the paradox of the Muslim Brotherhood is that despite its status officially as an 
illegal entity in Egypt, it has continued to exert influence socially, economically, 
religiously, and politically. This kind of influence which has been gained through 
experiences over decades is what this paper seeks to explore and relate to its role in 
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the 2011 Revolution and its plan for state building. This study will also explore the 
different tactics that were practiced by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and 
Justice Party in political participation and how they are similar to the tactics that were 
practiced by the National Democratic Party. This tactics such as intimidation of 
opposition and lack of transparency have led to the culmination of mass grievances by 
the Egyptian people, which will tested their popularity as they were being held 
accountable for their promises as the ruling party, as they failed to meet these 
promises they were revolted against in the 30th of June Uprising.  
 
1.2 Hypothesis 
This paper will seek to demonstrate that the Muslim Brotherhood has been 
influential in the 2011 Revolution. This paper will display that the internal 
characteristics in the structure of the Muslim Brotherhood how these have affected 
their participation in the 2011 Revolution. This paper will also link how the image 
gained through their popular charitable services have made the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
transition into politics easier as they have gained mass popularity amongst the 
Egyptians. Bearing in mind how they built their image as an opposition force under 
Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak, has helped shape their image as an organized opposition 
force fighting authoritarianism, resulting in an increase in their ability to recruit 
members who opposed the idea of authoritarianism. Since Muslim Brotherhood has 
also gained creditability through its participation in civil society, its popularity 
amongst the lower and middle class Egyptians would lead to them being able to play 
an influential role in the 2011 Revolution. This study will seek to link that criticisms 
of the opposition to the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in order to display how 
their more organized grassroots connections as opposed to the more liberal 
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movements who lacked the same connections enabled the Muslim Brotherhood to 
have political successes.  
This paper will also seek to argue that an elected movement with mass 
popularity does not necessarily equate with the transition to a democracy with a 
popular government. Through the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and 
Justice Party, it becomes evident that despite the Muslim Brotherhood coming into 
power through democratic means they are using the same legal and illegal tactics of 
the National Democratic Party in order to intimidate and stifle their opposition.  
 
1.3 Conceptual Framework 
 
In order to fully portray the multi-dimensional nature of this topic and the 
transition in organizations built upon religious ideologies to the practicing of politics 
as a legal party; this thesis will adopt several theories in the process of arguing the 
role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 2011 Revolution as well as their evolution 
which brought them into the political scene in Egypt. This study will explain the 
different theories of political Islam as well as the ideological theories which have 
helped develop the Muslim Brotherhood such as the ideologies of Hassan al-Banna, 
Sayid Qutb and Hassan al-Hudaybi. These theories help show on an individual level 
of analysis, how the individual can have an effect on the development of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. These individual works will help portray the justifications that have 
been given to explain the transition from a group that is based on mass education to a 
group which participates in elections.  
In order to understand the evolution that has occurred since the creation of the 
Muslim Brotherhood to its role as the ruling party this thesis will take into account the 
different regimes under which the Muslim Brotherhood developed and the form of 
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governments in Egypt which were all authoritarian regimes and the different tools 
such as legal tools which these regimes take in order to explain how the Muslim 
Brotherhood was affected.This method will provide a comprehensive view of how the 
Muslim Brotherhood became a political force which has gained such electoral 
successes in the post Arab Spring Egypt despite them being an illegal group since 
their creation. This study will also discuss the tools that the Muslim Brotherhood used 
in order to gain recruits and mass mobilize people such as the rally effect, as well as 
social mobilization theory. One of the most widely accepted accounts is based directly 
on Emile Durkheim's analysis of social change in which she explains how groups 
such as the Muslim Brotherhood are symbolic of traditional beliefs where 
authoritarian regimes were “westernizing” Egypt.  This study will also link concepts 
such as Crane Brinton’s The Anatomy of Revolution, which studies the patterns of a 
revolution; such will be equated to the Brotherhood and the Egyptian experience to 
come up with a theoretical evaluation of events. 
1.4 Methodology 
The comparative methodology used in this thesis in the approach to a 
conclusion best displays the changes in the Muslim Brotherhood and their effect. This 
is primarily achieved through the study of works written by academics who have 
written about the subject matter. This study will analyze these works and through 
reading multiple credible academic sources such as books and articles written by 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood. This will result in a more elaborate view of the 
nature of the Muslim Brotherhood and its transition into politics as a legal party as 
opposed to an underground, illegal organization. In order to better understand this 
transition, this study will look for patterns in the political and social activities of the 
Muslim Brotherhood under the regimes of Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak. This study, 
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which while focusing on the Muslim Brotherhood, employs both deductive and 
inductive reasoning by looking the participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in society 
in order to determine how these actions could possibly increase the popularity of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and eventually resulting in the political successes gained by its 
Freedom and Justice Party.  
It is also important to look at existing patterns in the participation of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab Spring. In order to understand its role in the 
Egyptian Revolution, there is a need to explore the structure of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in order to properly understand how it functions. This will be obtained 
by detailed research into the Muslim Brotherhood’s structure and how this can 
possible affect its performance in politics and its popularity in society. In addition to 
this, there will be an investigation into the role the Muslim Brotherhood in society 
through its charity functions. In order to achieve this information, this thesis will 
include references to lectures given by prominent members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the Freedom and Justice Party as well as accounts of citizens who have 
benefited from the charity functions of the Muslim Brotherhood. In order to 
understand the political scene of Egypt in the post Arab Spring revolutions, this thesis 
will include mentions of talks given by activists from the opposition in order to 
understand their assessment of the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in the post 
January 2011 Revolution as well as the failures which led to the demise of the group. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Creation of the Muslim Brotherhood 
            There are many aspects in approaching the topic of the development of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and how this development enabled their participation in the 
2011 Revolution. The creation and the ideology behind the Muslim Brotherhood is 
important when studying the organization’s development. The Muslim Brotherhood is 
a complex organization that works in a multifaceted environment encompassing the 
social, economic, political, ideological and religious aspects of the Egypt. The history 
of the Muslim Brotherhood is directly correlated with the transformations that 
Egyptian society underwent. Many authors have written about the creation of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and its development since. In studying the history of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the reasoning behind its ideology becomes evident which is essential in 
analyzing the development of the ideology and its application in the post January 25 
Revolution. 
 The creation of the Muslim of the Muslim Brotherhood can be seen in the 
participation of its creator Hassan al-Banna prior to him creating the Muslim 
Brotherhood in organizations with similar emphasis on religion. Author Richard 
Mitchell discusses in his book the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood in his book 
The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood. The title of the book is indicative to the 
difference in opinion regarding how to label the Muslim Brotherhood. His labeling 
the group as a “society” shows how close the group is to each other, as it thrives on 
the family like units it creates through recruiting members and ensuring they interact 
with each other. Mitchell goes into depth about the history of Hassan al-Banna and 
how he was involved in several groups which called for fighting immorality on the 
streets. These groups which al-Banna joined preached to people the importance of 
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staying close towards what was deemed proper by Islam and tried to prevent people 
from being immoral. Mitchell explains how these groups would have influenced the 
al-Banna and the way he structured his group, the Muslim Brotherhood and its 
ideology. One important factor which Mitchell discusses is how Cairo affected his 
point of view and the lack of religiousness which he observed there. One crucial point 
in the development of al-Banna which affects his creation of the Muslim Brotherhood 
is al-Banna’s time in Ismailya. One important aspect that Mitchell does not discuss is 
the significance of Ismailya to al-Banna’s ideology. In Ismailya, which is in the Suez 
Canal was a base for British soliders, al-Banna saw how women became prostitutes 
for these soldiers and saw their drinking which only gave him more incentive to 
create the Muslim Brotherhood.  
 Author William Cleveland in his book, A History of the Modern Middle East 
elaborates on the rise as well as the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. He 
explains that the Muslim Brotherhood begins in the late 1920s at the hands of Hassan 
al-Banna “a layman educated at the teachers training collage” (Cleveland, 199). This 
work by Cleveland goes into depth about the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
One interesting point that he focuses on is the reasoning behind the rise of the Muslim 
Brotherhood is a result of socio-economic reasons, which propelled al-Banna to create 
the Muslim Brotherhood. This reasoning, does not mention how colonialism plays a 
direct role in the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood, and how colonialism had 
directly affected al-Banna and caused him to create this group. In Cleveland’s book, 
the author takes a more historical approach and does not explain how the Muslim 
Brotherhood transcends past the Egyptian borders to spread across the whole Middle 
East and eventually becoming a global movement.  
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The creation of the Muslim Brotherhood can be credited to several reasons. 
These reasons can be observed internally and externally. The internal reasons, 
represented in the domestic issues in Egypt which lead to the creation of the Muslim 
Brotherhood are discussed by author Arthur Goldschmidt in his book A Concise 
History of the Middle East, he elaborates that people wanted social reform and the 
capitalists who dominated parliament did not see social reform as an objective which 
benefited their own goals. There existed many ideologies abroad such as Socialism 
and Marxism which had some appeal to the educated elite in Egypt, but none had the 
appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood which promised to fulfill the promises that 
parliament ignored.  He also explains that the conservative nature of the Middle East 
played a role in the rejection of secular ideas such as Marxism and the popularity and 
appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood who also advocated this conservatism.  
In James Glevin’s book, The Middle East: A History, he takes a very 
interesting approach in explaining the appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s. 
He discusses how successful the ideology was in light of the failures of the Middle 
Eastern governments. This would help explain the appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood 
since its ideology preaches to the creation of social justice. One aspect he could have 
elaborated on in the book would be how Egypt has gone through several ideologies 
that have failed. In this book he explains that the reason behind the widespread mass 
popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood is the failure of the Middle Eastern 
governments to fulfill the economic promises and as such the Muslim Brotherhood 
was able to take advantage of that lack of trust and anger in gaining supporters. One 
important aspect that Gelvin points out is that the defeat of the Middle Eastern armies 
and the loss of Palestine. This point helps explain how people blamed the 
governments and as such were looking for other options and the Muslim Brotherhood 
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represented a different ideology that could possibly fulfill these promises that were 
made by the governments. This sentiment is still present currently in the Middle East 
as the people were still looking for the group to fulfill the promises, and with the Arab 
Spring specifically in Egypt the people chose a different ideology which is political 
Islam.  
Ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood 
 The ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood stems from the examples which 
were set by the Prophet Mohamed and his followers, including the institutions. 
Mitchell explains the bases of the Muslim Brotherhood ideology by explaining their 
goals in society. In his book, Mitchell explains the development of the ideology of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, and its different stages. He explains that the foundation of the 
ideology of the Muslim Brothers encompasses that “Islam [is] a total system… [and] 
is applicable to all times and all places” (Mitchell, 14). The author clearly explains the 
ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and how Hassan al-Banna personally 
contributed to this thought, and internalized it, and further developed it through 
applying it to the creation and the ideology of his new organization which he went on 
to preach in order to gain new members. The evolution of the group’s ideology 
becomes evident as the organization shifted from one that preached reform through 
education to one which called for reform through demonstrations. Mitchell uses a 
historical approach to the Muslim Brotherhood. Ideologies in the Muslim 
Brotherhood are represented through slogans such as “the Qur’an is our constitution”. 
An important factor to look at within these slogans is how adaptable they are to the 
modern notion of a state. Goldschmidt elaborates on the significance of the slogan 
and how the Muslim Brotherhood used it to their advantage. During the fight for 
independence the Muslim Brotherhood phrased slogans that held wider appeal to 
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Egyptians in order to gain more supporters and call for the necessary Islamic reforms 
they saw as needed in the Egyptian society.  After the creation of the Muslim 
Brotherhood by Hassan al-Banna they began to recruit members from the Suez Canal 
city of Ismaliya where they capitalized on Egyptians’ observation that Egypt is 
becoming Westernized in order to gain more members. 
The reactionary aspect of the Muslim Brotherhood is a point which is 
elaborated in Goldschmidt’s book in which he explains that their ideology stemmed 
from what they saw as an increasing westernization in Egyptian society seen through 
“motion pictures, bars, modern female fashions” (Goldschmidt, 250). In this point 
Goldschmidt explains how the movement is a reactionary one to the developments 
that were observed in the Middle East and these westernization efforts caused people 
to want to hold on to their culture and heritage more. Goldschmidt also explains that 
the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood was popular to because it appealed to the 
average Egyptian as it preached equality.  
At a time when there was little social justice and poverty and illiteracy was 
very common an ideology which promised social change is seen as very important. 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology is also seen as deeply intertwined with the 
movement for independence and as such it became widely popular with Egyptians 
who were fighting for independence from the British. According to Goldschmidt the 
ultimate goal of the Muslim Brotherhood is to “restore the customs and institutions of 
Islam established by Muhammed and his followers” (Goldschmidt, 250). This point is 
contested by author Gelvin who remarks that the Muslim Brotherhood had “made its 
peace with the modern nation-state system” (Gelvin. 188). This dilemma still exists in 
the modern day institution of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is the reconciliation of 
the old ideologies with the more modern notions of a state.  
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An important aspect of the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood can be 
observed in the different changes that occur under the different Supreme Guides. 
Mitchell elaborates about the shift in ideology that accompanied the time of al-
Hudaybi and how he represented a change in the ideology from the established status 
quo which is rebelling against the regime. For example, Supreme Guide Hassan al 
Hudaybi, unlike previous Supreme Guide Hassan al-Banna who saw that party 
politics were detrimental to the state, participated in the negotiations with the 
government and helped instigate reforms that would help gain a better social justice 
such the land reforms (Mitchell, 107). Author Barbra H. E. Zollner helped elaborate 
on the role of al-Hudaybi and the change that occurred in the Muslim Brotherhood 
with the change in leadership. This sheds light on how the individual can help bring 
about change in the group and eventually lead to a change in the ideology. Zollener’s 
book, The Muslim Brotherhood Hassan al-Hudaybi and Ideology, there are specific 
references to the changes in ideology which have occurred under al-Hudaybi and how 
he approached his new role as the Supreme Guide through seeing it as a symbolic one 
and reformed the ideology and practices such as by eliminating the Secret Unit which 
is the military branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and even threatening to resign if his 
demand was not met.  
The Muslim Brotherhood continues to adopt and evolve with the changes that 
occur in the political scene. One important aspect that is briefly mentioned in these 
works of literature is the transitions that caused for splinter movements within the 
group. This change is important because it can be observed currently in the Muslim 
Brotherhood. After members of the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to assassinate 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser, he imprisoned many members causing many to flee to 
Gulf countries. This radicalization of the Muslim Brotherhood can be credited to the 
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regime not fulfilling its promises to implement Sharia to the members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, at first Nasser did not fulfill the goals of turning the Egyptian society 
into a more Islamic one and as such they tried to assassinate him. These paramilitary 
activities of the Muslim Brotherhood can also be observed when Sadat signed the 
peace treaty with Israel in which he was declared an infidel and therefore his death 
would be justified. These transitions are mentioned briefly in the works of Gelvin, 
Mitchell and Goldschmidt. This analysis of the splits which occur within the 
movement based on ideology can be analyzed and linked to the Muslim Brotherhood 
today as internal splits occur due to issues such as the generational gap as well as the 
approach to take through the Freedom and Justice Party regarding state building in 
Egypt.  
The Muslim Brotherhood in Politics  
The Muslim Brotherhood according to scholar Barry Rubin is “by far the most 
successful Islamist group in the world” (Rubin, 1). This analysis of the Muslim 
Brotherhood can be observed in the writings of several scholars which have analyzed 
the reasons behind the success of the Muslim Brotherhood and how the movement has 
managed to survive several attempts by authoritarian to end the movement.  On the 
other end of the spectrum, many scholars have made opposing statements regarding 
their performance in the post January 25 Revolution, but they do not negate the 
strength of the movement and their ability to mobilize. Several scholars have 
addressed the political participation of the Muslim Brotherhood since their creation. 
While Rubin makes this assessment it is important to point out the flaws within the 
movement itself. In his book, The Muslim Brotherhood the Organization and Policies 
of a Global Islamist Movement Rubin makes detailed references regarding the 
strength of the Muslim Brotherhood as a movement including how they managed to 
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survive the regimes determined to end them. The Muslim Brotherhood was initially 
launched into society in the late 1920s as a method to educate members about 
“gaining the correct understandings of Islam” (Franganillo, 40). The organization 
according to authors Soange and Franganillo became very politicized with the youth 
taking to the streets to organize mass demonstrations for the application of Sharia. 
These authors approach the Muslim Brotherhood’s participation in politics in Egypt 
from its creation to show how the policies of the Muslim Brotherhood were affected 
by domestic and international factors. The domestic factors include the regimes and 
the colonialism, and the international factors include the experiences of Italy and 
Germany. The authors then progress to discuss the development of the Muslim 
Brotherhood under Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak to explain how the Brotherhood 
managed to survive the authoritarian tactics to end the Muslim Brotherhood. The 
actions undertaken by the Muslim Brotherhood during these regimes have showed 
their strength in organizational abilities. These organizational abilities and 
experiences can be seen in the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood 2011 Revolution 
such as mobilization as well as the subsequent nation building. Literature regarding 
the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood’s transition into a legal party point out 
interesting points about their application of their ideology into modern state building, 
as well as the tactics that are were undertaken to consolidate power. This thesis 
analyzes the performance of the Freedom and Justice party, but through these actions, 
it becomes obvious that the Freedom and Justice Party are undertaking the same 
tactics as the National Democratic Party which shows that a popular movement that 
was brought to power through democratic elections does not necessarily mean 
popular, democratic policies. 
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Muslim Brotherhood Under Nasser 
The Muslim Brotherhood were very active under Nasser, as authors 
Franganillo and Soage observe they collaborated with Nasser to overthrow the 
monarchy. One important point that these authors make is that the Nasser era brought 
about one of the most influential thinkers in all of the Muslim Brotherhood’s history, 
Sayid Qutb. One important point that should have been made clear about Sayid Qutb 
is the development of his ideology and how this has come to affect the overall 
transition of the Muslim Brotherhood into politics. Sayid Qutb’s ideology was not 
conceptualized by just his time in prison, but also by the time he spent abroad and 
observing Western culture which he saw as immoral. What is also important 
regarding the Qutb ideology is how it has resonated on future generations of the 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood, through creating splinter ideological 
movements. This work does not discuss the relationship between Nasser and the 
Muslim Brotherhood prior to his crackdown, in which they entered a phase of reform 
and negotiations. This phase between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Nasser regime 
is fully elaborated on by author Richard Mitchell, in which he explains that the 
Muslim Brotherhood turned against Nasser after he did not implement Sharia, causing 
the Muslim Brotherhood to organize demonstrations and eventually try to assassinate 
him.  
The Muslim Brotherhood under Sadat 
 The Muslim Brotherhood under the era of President Anwar Sadat is very 
important to the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood. Under the era of Sadat, authors 
Nathan Brown and Emad El-Din Shahin in the book Politics and Society in the 
Contemporary Middle East comment saying that Sadat had eased restrictions but it 
was only to serve the purpose of the regime of countering the left ideology. This is 
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important to the development of the Muslim Brotherhood, but the literature does not 
point out the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood in these times and how by then the 
organization had spread past the borders of Egypt to become a global one. One 
important aspect in this chapter is that it signifies the beginning of the transition of the 
Muslim Brotherhood into electoral politics. Where, as Brown and El-Din point out the 
Muslim Brotherhood began running as independents for parliamentary elections. The 
splinter group which followed Qutb’s ideology is not mentioned in this chapter but is 
mentioned by Soange and Franganillo who explain how the group successfully 
assassinates Sadat.  The literature in this era of the Muslim Brotherhood tends to 
focus on the extremists that assassinated Sadat, but this reflects only a portion of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, during the time of Sadat the Muslim Brotherhood were great 
participants in civil society. In this era of the Muslim Brotherhood it can be argued as 
one of the most important eras of the group because it ultimately shaped their image 
in the Mubarak years as an extremist group that needs to be jailed. The actions taken 
by extremists still play an important role in the perception of the Muslim Brotherhood 
into the 2011 Revolution where the regime shaped itself as the protector against such 
groups.  
Muslim Brotherhood under Mubarak  
 The Muslim Brotherhood under the era of Mubarak experienced much of the 
same treatment as under Nasser.  The Muslim Brotherhood’s activities during the 
Mubarak era is seen as very important as they gain many grassroots support which 
would have affected their electoral success during the post Arab Spring Egyptian 
elections.  The literature explains in detail how the Muslim Brotherhood was 
suppressed through the use of legal tactics in order to prevent them from maintaining 
activities. These tactics, as authors Brown and El-Din explain include the emergency 
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law which was used to arrest the Muslim Brotherhood and due to the legalities of the 
emergency law, no warrant is needed. Another legal tactic which was used to limit the 
participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in politics as authors Soange and Franganillo 
explain the civil society law was reformed in order to curb the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
participation. Yet despite all these attempts, the Muslim Brotherhood were able to 
mobilize and participate in union elections in which they were able to gain massive 
successes. One of the most agreed upon regarding the popularity of the Muslim 
Brotherhood is the effect of the 1992 earthquake. Their ability to mobilize and help 
those who were left homeless efficiently unlike the regime, helped portray them as 
capable of handling crisis situations. The true popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood 
can be seen in the legislative elections  of 2005 in which they were able to win a 
significant amount of the seats, despite all the legal barriers to their participation in 
politics, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to field candidates as independents. The 
2010 elections had even less even less opposition represented and was considered one 
of the fueling points for the 2011 Revolution.  
 The Muslim Brotherhood under the rule of Mubarak are represented as the 
most well organized opposition groups and were the cause of many legal changes in 
order for the regime to further consolidate its power. One event which could be linked 
to the performance of the Muslim Brotherhood is the Luxor Massacre of 1997, which 
is not mentioned in the literature. The regime would group together Islamists in order 
to cause people to fear them from them and try to reject them from participation. By 
then the ideological problems had caused several splits in the Muslim Brotherhood 
such as the generational gap. The newer generations of the Muslim Brotherhood, were 
made up as Soange and Franganillo describe as “modern men, with modern views” 
(Franganillo, 49). This is very similar to the events regarding the activities of the 
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Muslim Brotherhood today. Despite their organization, these ideological problems 
stemmed from the generation gap have affected the way their Freedom and Justice 
Party, because those in power are not from that generation of the modern men, but of 
those with radical ideologies, this connection is missing from the literature, but will 
be further explained and analyzed further in the study.  
Muslim Brotherhood in the 2011 Revolution 
 The Muslim Brotherhood in the post Arab Spring were able to solidify their 
presence in politics as they made the transition from simply a group to a legal party, 
the Freedom and Justice Party. The literature regarding the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
participation in the revolution all agree that they had no initial participation, but later 
when the movement looked like they could ultimately lead to success in the book, The 
Arab Spring Will It Lead to Democratic Transitions, scholars Clement Henry, Jang Ji-
Hyang and Robert P. Parks make the assessment that the Muslim Brotherhood were 
not “at the forefront” (Henry, 18). This is one of the greatest criticisms of the Muslim 
Brotherhood during the revolution, yet despite that they were able to gain huge 
electoral successes. Author Nathan Brown analyzes the performance of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the post Arab Spring Egypt explaining that the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
slogan to political participation is “participation not domination” yet despite that, it is 
seen as dominating the political scene by running for seats in every council and union. 
These actions are not criticized by Nathan Brown, which would be observed through 
seeing the dilemmas which resulted since the Freedom and Justice Party assumed the 
highest office, the presidential office indicating that a popular president does not 
necessarily mean a democratic one. One important point that scholars Clement Henry, 
Jang Ji-Hyang and Robert P. Parks are able to make as a post-Arab Spring literature is 
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that the Muslim Brotherhood’s party, the Freedom and Justice Party will face 
ideological problems.  
 The work by Carrie Wickham titled, “The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of 
an Islamist Movement” details the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood with specific 
focus to the group’s development in Egypt. One of the most intriguing chapters 
discusses the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood from a charity group to a political 
group as an extension of the group’s da’wa mission because it highlights the notion of 
politics as a from below process. The Muslim Brotherhood upon recognizing that in 
order to change the system they must involve themselves in politics in order to be able 
to carry out their mission. Wickham’s work displays the tactics used by the Muslim 
Brotherhood which have made them even stronger as a political group, which shows 
existing trends and tactics undertaken by the group since their creation.    
 This study will seek to use the literature in order to make links between the pre 
2011 Muslim Brotherhood and post the Revolution. These conflicting ideologies 
caused because of the differences in time era and the generational gaps are creating 
many internal problems for the group itself and subsequently affecting its 
performance in the state building efforts.  
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Chapter 3: The Muslim Brotherhood before 2011 Revolution 
3.1 Hassan al-Banna and the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood 
 Hassan al Banna was born in a conservative family with four other siblings. 
He was raised to value religion in his daily life and was enrolled in a religious school. 
This school marked the beginning of al Banna’s path to formulate his religious 
ideology to transform society. He was born in October of 1906 in the town of 
Mahmudiyya, a town near the city of Alexandria. From an early age Hassan al-Banna 
participated in several religious organizations who tried to reform society by calling 
for people to closely follow the teachings of Islam. These organizations helped shape 
his world views as well as giving him the experience to eventually create his own 
organization, the Muslim Brotherhood. 
 At the age of 12 in 1918 he joined the Society for Moral Behaviour and 
eventually climbed the ranks of the society to be its leader. He criticized this 
organization though by claiming that it was not doing enough to call for people to 
implement the religious teaching in their daily lives, and as a result joined the Society 
for the Prevention of the Forbidden which as scholar Richard Mitchell describes it 
went “deeper” into the roots of society (Mitchell, 2). This society differed from others 
because it took a more threatening tone towards people through sending threatening 
letters to anyone they deemed was committing a sin. Another organization that al-
Banna joined was the Hasafiyya Society for Charity (Mitchell, 2). This organization 
had a different message than the previous organizations that al-Banna joined because 
unlike the others it targeted the actions of Christian monasteries who they saw as 
threatening Islam in society. This group was particularly influential for al-Banna’s life 
because it was where he started getting involved in Sufism. A-Banna would come to 
read various material about Sufism eventually joining a dhikr circle and “becoming a 
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disciple of its leading shaykh (Mitchell, 2). 
 By the end of al-Banna’s primary education he participated along with many 
of the members of society in the 1919 Revolution and the student movements which 
called for the end of British colonialism in Egypt. This represented how politically 
involved al-Banna was and his aims at freeing Egypt from the British who had 
corrupted Egypt economically as well as morally. He, like many others was affected 
by colonialism in a direct way, “remembered with special bitterness the sight of 
British forces in occupation of his home town at the time” (Mitchell, 3).  
 Hassan al-Banna eventually joined the Teachers Training School, but 
eventually left it for the Dar al-’Ulm. In his time during Dar al-’Ulm al-Banna’s 
ideology began taking shape, he was influenced by several figures during his 
education and expanded on his knowledge of Islam and its teachings. He would read 
various materials about the teachings of Islam and how to best apply it to a society. 
He would also read historical books about resistance, heroics, and defending religion, 
a philosophy that would eventually shape his own group the Society of Muslim 
Brothers, more commonly known as the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Banna then moved 
to Cairo in 1923 and was shocked by the state of moral debauchery that existed in the 
capital and how separated people were becoming from Islam. Al-Banna observed 
situations in the capital that were not in his village such as women’s fashion and 
cinemas as well as literary salons. He also observed many political problems such as 
party pluralism, which according to al-Banna caused disunity in the state. He places 
the blame for this lack of unity on the hands of the Wafd and the Liberal 
Constitutionalists who’s irresponsibility caused this disunity in society. He was deeply 
angered by the situation in Egypt and began to look for ways to improve the situation: 
 “No one but God knows how many nights we [Banna and comrades] spent 
reviewing the state of the nation… analysing the sickness, and thinking of the 
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possible remedies. So disturbed were we that we reached the point of tears” 
(Paison 2-3). 
 
Al-Banna, in response to the situation in Cairo, joined another religious group, 
the Islamic Society for Nobility and Character. This group was different than others 
which al-Banna has previously joined; their approach was more based on preaching to 
people at mosques about the proper conduct of Islam and its application in daily life. 
Al-Banna felt that this group was not doing enough and took it upon himself and other 
fellow members from the Dar al-‘Ulm to venture in other venues such as  “coffee 
houses and other popular meeting places” (Mitchell, 5). 
 By the end of al-Banna’s time in the Dar al-‘Ulm he wrote an essay in which 
he took it upon himself to: 
“become a counsellor and a teacher, giving himself, by day to the children, 
and by night to their parents, to the task of teaching ‘the objectives of religion 
and the sources of their wellbeing and happiness in life’. He would bring to 
this mission ‘perseverance and sacrifice’, study and understanding, and a body 
willing to face the hardship and a soul which ‘he had sold to God’. ‘This is a 
covenant between me and God’ (Mitchell, 6).   
 
This symbolized the commitment on the part of al-Banna to help guide Egypt back to 
the path of what he deemed as morally and religiously right. Al- Banna then accepted 
a position in the city of Isma’iliyya in 1928. His post in Isma’iliyya was very life 
changing because it eventually inspired him to create the Muslim Brotherhood. He 
observed a socio-economic problem amongst the people, according to Mitchell; he 
observed the extreme poverty that came because of the abuse of the British 
colonialists the Egyptian labour force. Another problem which he observed in Suez 
Canal City, was the wide spread of moral breakdown. Ismai’liyya was a post for 
British soldiers in which he observed instances such as drinking as well as prostitution 
which angered him even further. He blamed the British for the fall of society from the 
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teachings of Islam, leading the people to follow similar behaviours as those by the 
British. To al-Banna, this was seen as part of the repercussions of the Kemalist 
movement which called for the secularization of the state and the complete separation 
of religion and state, a matter which was completely unacceptable to al-Banna. This 
was seen as part of the corruption of party politics as well, because al-Banna credits 
these movements to have corrupted the youth in their efforts to turn Egypt into a 
secular society.    
 Al-Banna blamed the moral downfall of Egypt on the British, “I believe that 
my people, because of the political stages which they have passed through them, and 
under the impact of western civilization… materialist philosophy and franji traditions, 
have departed from the goals of their faith” (Mitchell, 6). He also blamed them for the 
political problems that Egypt faced at the time “while the British provided an initial 
target, the failure of the Wafd and the intensified struggle in Palestine provided further 
openings in the political environment that helped the organization sustain its rapid 
mobilization” (Munson, 495). This enforced goals of the group, to eliminate all forms 
of foreign influence in Egypt, and to “reconstitute Egypt as an Islamic state” 
(Caromba and Solomon, 119). A teacher once suggested to al-Banna and his friends to 
organize their group to influence positively the formation of their character and 
manners by way of practical training rather than mere abstract lessons. They would 
fuse educational theories with the Quran injunction, “to enjoin good and prohibit 
wrong,” which actually played a crucial role when he becomes an Islamic activist 
(Krämer, 9). During his time in Isma’illya he also worked at creating a grassroots 
support network through supporting other religious groups while preaching on his 
own. He familiarized himself with the local leaders of the town, a tactic that would 
gain him further support in the town. Eventually after several people contacted him 
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about creating a new group which would be more effective, he accepted and launched 
what would be known as the Society of Muslim Brothers. When he first created the 
group he would focus on the:  
“construction of a mosque, using funds from membership dues and grants 
from local businesses. A boy's school, girl's school, and social club were 
subsequently added to the complex as the organization grew. Each new branch 
of the Society followed a similar pattern of growth. The organization would 
establish a branch headquarters and then immediately begin a public service 
project-the construction of a mosque, school, or clinic, the support of a local 
handicraft industry, or the organization of a sports program. This private social 
service infrastructure grew quickly and became an important part of the 
Egyptian social, political, and economic landscape.” (Munson, 496) 
 
These actions would serve as very important to the increase in the membership of the 
group because it would gain them more support in the society which they would be 
forming. Building these forms of infrastructure would also instil a sense a sense of 
loyalty and gratitude in the people and would entrench the group in society.   
  
Hassan al-Banna began to call for direct goals to be applied in society such as 
the implication of Sharia which: 
 “was originally formulated to meet a specific set of historical circumstances 
and was thus a product of informed human reasoning. In al-Banna’s view the restored 
Shariah would be subject to interpretation and would hence be fully compatible with 
the needs of a modern society” (Cleveland, 200).  
 
He took it upon himself to spread the number of followers of his cause while 
keeping the contacts he made while he was in Cairo. Al-Banna “sought to find a way 
for Muslims to take advantage of the technological advances of the twentieth century 
without feeling that they were compromising their commitment to Islamic values” 
(Cleveland, 199). This shows how the group was very innovative in its technique in 
spreading the message. The call for a more stricter application of Islam in society are 
not new, but what made the Muslim Brotherhood different was their approach to 
spreading the message by appealing to society at a deeper level through preaching. 
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This is how the organization started which is a preaching organization to help apply 
Islam better in society, but it eventually evolved past that.  Amongst the technological 
advancements that the Muslim Brotherhood took advantage of was the printing press 
technology where they used to print publications to help spread their works across 
several mediums not just through preaching. One of the greatest methods that were 
utilized by the group to spread their message was the use of newspapers and 
magazines. Mitchell comments explaining that the group began spreading a newsletter 
and then gradually evolved to the publication of a journal called Majallat al-Ikhwan 
al-Muslimin. The use of publications to spread the group’s ideology in the beginning 
of the group signifies how the group evolved in order to appeal to more groups as 
opposed to simply focusing on those who needed economic benefits, the group 
appealed to the educated. 
 Al-Banna’s group took advantage of the situation in Cairo where the 
politicians were busy fighting amongst themselves to appeal to the poor and 
disenfranchised through appealing to their religious nature. This helped them gain the 
supported they needed in order to make sure that the organization became solidified in 
society. The Muslim Brotherhood took advantage of the calls for secularism in the 
state to gain more supporters sympathetic for the cause which was to implement a 
more strict form of Shariah. The Islamic identity in the country is one which is of 
prime importance and when British colonialism is seen to be threatening this identity 
the al-Banna and his supporters were able to use that to their advantage in order to 
gain even more members and spread their message of reform. The message of the 
group was gradual reform through preaching and basic social reform through 
providing social services in order to be able to gain more supporters to help spread 
throughout the country. Al-Banna took advantage of the connections he made 
Al Khalifa  32 
throughout his life in joining the several religious organizations to help spread his 
group even more. In the 1930s he merged smaller religious organizations into the 
Muslim Brotherhood in order to gain more supporters and branch out into other 
governorates. It took him three years after the initial decision to create the group to 
move the headquarters to Cairo in order to be able to solve the problems which he 
observed in Cairo raging from social problems of morality to economic problems 
such as the gap between the rich and the poor which was becoming larger. The 
Brotherhood was conceptualized to work on the morality and religiousness of the 
individual and society as a whole (Gul, 899). There were no political aspects in its 
early intervention as it sought to fill the social services that were being increasingly 
neglected by the government. As membership grew and the services expanded, it 
found that getting entangled with the political sphere was consequential. So that, even 
before they got involved in public administration, al-Banna and the Brotherhood had 
already started a cultural Islamization of Egypt through their services that were based 
on the love found in Islam; the other effect was the creation of an effective political 
network. They also never got tired of preaching to individuals and groups about the 
tenets of Islam. In effect, due to the need of change in society, the Brotherhood was 
able to generate its interpretation of Islam as a total system. It harboured a 
revolutionary idea that would later influence the rest of the Muslim world. Islam was 
no longer just a religion; it was an ideology for all times and for all places. 
During the interwar period the movement developed greatly into an anti-
colonial movements which was shaped by many developments in the region such as 
the creation of Israel in 1947 and the group was able to influence the issue by keeping 
the people speaking about the problem and organized several demonstrations in order 
to protest against the British who were seen as the cause of the problem. They 
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organizational power of the group was seen in how they created a paramilitary entity 
in the group, a secret apparatus which would fight in Palestine, and eventually stay for 
decades to come. In Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood helped by supporting the Arab 
Strike during 1936-1936 (Zollner, 12). This organizational strength of the movement 
to rally people for issues such as Palestine is the strongest aspect of the group and 
would keep the group the greatest opposition for groups such as the Wafd and the 
monarchy.  
The Secret Apparatus would be used by the Muslim Brotherhood in many acts 
of violence domestically. This group carry out attacks against British and Egyptian 
Jews who were seen as sympathizers of Zionism. After incriminating evidence of the 
existence of the Secret Apparatus Prime Minister Mahmud al-Nuqrashi ordered a ban 
on the group. The Secret Apparatus of the Muslim Brotherhood would gain the group 
stigma and label as a violent organization. By the end of the period of the leadership 
of Hassan al-Banna until his assassination, the Muslim Brotherhood would be banned 
by the government and Egypt would be placed under martial law. The issue of 
Palestine would be very important in the relationship between the state and the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Many Egyptians blamed the loss of Palestine on the 
government and thus further fuelling the anger against the government, adding 
support to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood would also be blamed 
for the Black Saturday in which, after the shooting of 50 Egyptian Officers by British 
soldiers, mass rioting would erupt where, “burning and looting of some 750 buildings 
and the country’s Opera House in downtown Cairo” (Cairo Fire). This would increase 
the popularity of the anti-Western sentiment would translate to an increase in the 
popularity of opposition groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. 
 The achievements of the Muslim Brotherhood from its creation until the time 
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of the 1952 Revolution is a reflection of how the group was very innovative. This 
period caused the movement to evolve in several ways in accordance to the political 
events which were on going in the country. The movement started as a reactionary 
movement as it emerged against the attempts to remove Egyptian traditions in order to 
modernize the state. The achievements of Hassan al-Banna represented in his ability 
to create such a group in light of strong opposition of the existing political forces such 
as the Wafd, the British and the monarchy shows the power of the individual in 
creating powerful social movements. The Muslim Brotherhood emerged from this 
period as a very strong movement; it had gained the trust of a class of people who 
were distrustful of the political elite (Soage, 40). The group also proved its value 
economically and socially as it’s “schools and hospitals offered crucial services to the 
urban working class” (Soage, 40). These services were essential as the group took 
advantage of the high levels of inflation that were caused because of wartime 
expenses as well as the high levels of unemployment because of the withdrawal of the 
Allied Forces to gain more supporters. This support system that the group offered 
increased its popularity and undermined the state, further angering the people and 
gaining the Muslim Brotherhood more members and sympathizers (Soage, 40). This 
support system that the Muslim Brotherhood provides, offering services that the state 
fails to provide would be one of the strongest strategies to gain the Muslim 
Brotherhood supporters as it shows the group as a viable alternative to the state, 
especially during elections and when mobilizing for protests.  
3.2 Ideology and Dynamic 
 The ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood has been in constant transformation 
since its initial creation. The Muslim Brotherhood drives its ideology from the 
teachings of Islam and then applying them to society. The basic school of thought 
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which the Muslim Brotherhood derives its ideology from is the Hanbali school of 
thought (Munson, 489).  Hassan al-Banna sought to elevate the role of religion in the 
state, that “Islam is no longer exclusively a religion, but an ideology that provides a 
total framework for all aspects of political, social, economic, and cultural life in the 
Muslim world” (Paison, 1).  
 The ideology of the group was very appealing for average Egyptians because 
“rooted in rich Islamic ideas and symbols, was tied to everyday Egyptian life and thus 
accessible to potential recruits” (Munson, 507). A characteristic that can be observed 
about this group is that it rose in order to preserve the Muslim identity of Egypt in the 
face of reforms that were instigated by the European powers which according to al-
Banna threatened society. When Hassan al-Banna first created the Muslim 
Brotherhood, he aimed it at educating people to be better Muslims in return he hoped 
to create a change in society, believing that this would lead to an improvement in 
society. This change would call for moral reform and also called for basic demands 
which would help society such as “as the strengthening of the army, increasing 
Egyptian ties with other Arab countries, an expansion of hospitals and clinics, the 
banning of usury, improvement of the working conditions of both agricultural and 
industrial” (Munson, 490). Al-Banna first started through reaching out to society this 
represented a method which would be the greatest asset of the group which is the 
ability to reach to society in all of its levels especially the lower classes. This method 
of spreading the group’s ideology to all parts of society in their own environment as 
opposed to keeping politics central to the main cities of Egypt as other parties did at 
the time would prove to be very successful and eventually lead to an increase in the 
members all over the country. According to Harvard University scholar Lorenzo 
Vidino, who specialized in political Islamic movements, Al-Banna also created social 
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programs which would create a bottom up change in society, removing the Western 
influence and Islamizing society (Vidino, 2).  
 During the 1930s the group would meet in a series of conferences and 
eventually begin in the formulation of the groups ideology, according to scholar 
Richard Mitchell, on the tenth anniversary of the group the members would outline 
the ideology of the group after its development for the past ten years. The Muslim 
Brotherhood would reach a decision that: 
“(1) Islam as a total system, complete unto itself, and the final arbiter of life in 
all of its categories; (2) an Islam formulated from and based on its two primary 
sources and the revelation in the Qur’an and the wisdom of the Prophet in the 
Sunna; and (3) an Islam applicable to all times and to all places” (Mitchell, 
14). 
 
This is the beginning of the religious ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and it 
established its identity as a religious group, it later evolved into trying to apply this 
ideology that it turned into a political mission. The group called for “an Islamic state 
and held that true Islam was essentially democratic and capable of solving the 
problems of the modern world” (Munson, 490). Al-Banna derived his ideology from 
his observations of society. One of the most significant aspects of the group’s 
ideology is its aversion to party politics, which was because of al-Banna’s observation 
that party politics is what caused the lack of unity in Cairo amongst the Egyptians 
who are supposed to be the ones responsible for Egypt. This lack of unity enabled the 
British to take advantage of the situation and exploit Egyptians.  
 The Muslim Brotherhood has been in constant evolution in accordance to the 
developments in Egyptian society. The Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology can be 
described as a reaction to the developments in Egyptian society. It was first 
formulated as a way to enable religious change in society. The decline in religion in 
society according to al-Banna was largely due to British imperialism. This notion of 
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the effect of the British on society yields the notion that al-Banna and his supporters 
observed not just economic and military effects of the British, but also the cultural 
imperialism which was symbolized through the Western institutions and ideas which 
were built at the time such as cinemas and cafes. According to Mitchell, what the 
cultural imperialism represented to al-Banna was more than just cafes and cinemas, it 
stemmed deeper since they “brought with them their laws, schools, languages and 
sciences; but also ‘their wine women, and sin’” (Mitchell, 224). The schools can be 
seen as the largest threat to the Egyptian society by the Muslim Brotherhood, because 
it passed on values to a new generation which would then be passed on to further 
generations. During the time there was a dual education system, one that was 
provided by al Azhar which was “a remnant of Islamic heritage” (Mitchell, 223) and 
the other was provided by the west. According Mitchell, Al-Banna saw these 
conflicting educational systems as dangerous to society because they caused further 
divide in society and the Western educational system promoted the traditions of the 
West which would cause even further moral divide in Egypt. The introduction of the 
British code of  laws, according to al-Banna, were seen as dangerous because they 
changed the thought process of society and “perverted the nations thought, mind and 
logic” (Mitchell, 223). Al-Banna noted that another reason he is resistant to these laws 
is that they do not represent Egyptian society. Al-Banna blamed the enabling of this 
change on the ulama which in his view were weak and incompetent. And through the 
1930s the Muslim Brotherhood organized mass protests to demand the 
implementation of Islamic law, Shariah. This cultural imperialism according to 
Mitchell was seen as to have “corrupted society, bred immorality, and destroyed the 
traditional values of Muslim society” (Mitchell, 223). Al-Banna’s ideology was a 
resistance to this change in society and he saw that the way to stop this process was 
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Islam, which explains the origin of the slogan “Islam is the answer” (Vidino, 1).  
 Al- Banna saw that the imperialism of the Western powers needed to be solved 
in order to save the identity of Egyptian society. According to Vidino, al-Banna called 
for the establishment of an Islamic state through gradual reform of society to remove 
Western influences. Mitchell also comments on this aspect of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, noting that the Muslim Brotherhood observed a problem in society and 
their solution to this problem was a dawla muslima which translates to a strong 
Muslim state. They viewed the teachings of Islam as all inclusive which would 
encompass state and society as well. Al-Banna saw that a bottom up approach to the 
changes in society was the best possible solution because this would eventually result 
in a change in government to reflect the change in society. Al-Banna wanted to reach 
this through a dawa based approach which is spreading the message and through 
education in society. This was the greatest strength of the Muslim Brotherhood, which 
is their complex organization. Lorenzo Vidino explains that the organization under 
Hassan al-Banna adopted:  
“a capillary structure that included mosques, professional organizations, charities, 
social services, and publications. Internally, the Brotherhood subdivided itself into 
a myriad of sub-organizations and committees, each with a very precise structure 
and goal” (Vidino, 2). 
 
This structure provided great success for the movement as in less than 20 years the 
organizations’ number of members to increase exponentially with over half a million 
members and millions of sympathizers everywhere in the country, as its message 
targeted the lower middle class as well as disfranchised which made up a large portion 
of Egyptian society. Groups with ideologies such as the Muslim Brotherhood’s are 
very popular and gain many supporters because “offering a reaffirmation of 
traditional beliefs and an outlet for the frustrations of anomic social conditions 
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brought on by rapid population expansion, urbanization, and industrialization” 
(Munson, 491). 
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3.2.1 Structure of the Muslim Brotherhood 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The structure of the Muslim Brotherhood (Mitchell, 194) 
This structure of the Muslim Brotherhood was introduced under the leadership 
of Hassan al Banna where he first began transforming the organization and giving it a 
specific structure. This structure is very important to the success of the organization 
since its creation as it enabled and continued to enable it to be a strong player on the 
political as well as the social front. The reforms which were proposed under Hassan 
al-Banna were later adopted by the second General Guide, Hassan al-Hudaybi. These 
reforms were seen as necessary in order to maintain the activities of the group and to 
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ensure specialization, so that different groups can work in the different fields where 
they are the most experienced thus achieving efficiency in the group. The family 
section of the group is as it helps address a problem that al-Banna observed in society 
which is the lack of morals in society. This observation is seen to have influenced this 
sector of the group, according to Mitchell, the purpose is “to achieve fulfilment of the 
meaning of Islam among the Brothers” (Mitchel, 195). This family can be seen as a 
building block in the organization and is aimed to strengthen the ideology within the 
group itself and to help create a stronger foundation within the group.  One important 
aspect in the hierarchy of the Muslim Brotherhood is that it uses democratic methods 
to elect its General Guide. Members elect their General Guide through direct voting in 
which the guide serves a certain term. The top hierarchy of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
called the Guidance Office, always composed of 15 senior members and among them, 
there was a Supreme Guide. Each member of this office had his own jurisdiction: 
education, university recruitment, or politics, and each Guidance Office member had 
his own deputy in each jurisdiction for every region in Egypt. This chain of command 
proved advantageous in the sense that communication was a two-way process, 
efficient and effective. The hierarchy of the organization also inspires loyalty within 
the group and instils a sense of commitment to the group as it enables them to be part 
of a larger organization. In the group: 
“First-level members were called "assistants" and were required only to sign a 
membership card and pay dues. At the second level were "related" members 
who were required to demonstrate a knowledge of the Society's principles, 
attend meetings regularly, and perform an oath of obedience. Third-level 
members were called "active" and were expected to entirely immerse their lives 
in the organization, including high achievement in Quranic learning, observance 
of all Islamic obligations, and regular physical training” (Munson, 497). 
 
 The structure within the group values loyalty and its strict structure has 
allowed it to survive the regimes of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak who have tried to 
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destroy the groups, yet the ability to mobilize through this efficient system has 
enabled the group to be able to be a part of Egyptian politics for decades. This 
structure is not by coincidence as scholar Samuel Tadros explains in an interview with 
the Deputy General Guide Khairat El- Shater, “He attributes Banna’s methodology 
and the structure he invented to the Prophet himself. He quotes the Caliph Omar as 
saying, “there is no religion without a Gama’a and no Gama’a without an Imam, and 
no Imam without obedience” (Tadros, 2013). This specific example is meant that: 
“this means officials, structure and groups; a particular structure, not just a matter of 
circumstances. This structure also needs to be obeyed and committed to.” He stresses 
the point further by arguing that, “not any gathering is a Gama’a, even if it was a 
group of good people who are committed to Islam; they are not a Gama’a as such 
without their structures and officials, no system, commitment, and obedience” 
(Tadros, 2013). 
 
 
An important theme when studying the development of the Muslim 
Brotherhood is looking at the group’s paramilitary activities. During the group’s 
initial political activities protesting for the implementation of Islamic law, there were 
several confrontations with the security forces which often turned violent. These 
confrontations with the state led to the group establishing what would be known as 
the Secret Apparatus which would the group’s paramilitary sector which would be 
responsible for protecting the group from the security forces as well as the 
government. According to Mitchel, the original date of the creation of this group is 
unknown, but is estimated to be in the late 1930s. The group began setting up training 
camps to train members who were very loyal to the group in order to better help 
protect the group.  
 The shift in the group can be noticed as it became obvious that gradual reform 
was not going to be able to achieve the group’s dream of an Islamic society. This 
feeling was accompanied by a sense of betrayal of officials who did not sympathize 
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with the group or its calls for Islamic reform caused the group to turn against the 
government. A series of historical developments in the region were instrumental to the 
evolution of the group. In the early 1940s the appointment of Nahas Pasha despite 
King Farouk’s wishes caused a large sense of betrayal amongst the Egyptians and 
increased the anti-Western sentiment in Egypt as this was seen as an infringement on 
Egyptian affairs. This helped the Muslim Brotherhood gain even more supporters 
because of its anti-Western sentiments. The creation of the state of Israel was seen as 
the largest failure of the government, and the Muslim Brotherhood blamed the 
government for the loss of Palestinian land. The creation of Israel becomes the most 
influential event to the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood and ultimately redefines 
its relationship with the government. The creation of Israel ushers a wave of anti-
governmental protests as well as multiple assassination attempts and successes against 
prominent figures in Egyptian politics in 1948. This wave of violence causes the 
government to ban the group in December of 1948 (Mitchell, 67). In February of the 
following year Hassan al-Banna was assassinated with debates rising, some blaming 
the government, others blaming the group itself. 
 The use of violence in the group goes against the doctrine of gradual reform 
which was first undertaken by the group, but with the lack of observable 
achievements on the ground as well as how slow this process was, many members 
grew impatient. The ideology of Sayid Qutb represented the splinter group which 
arose from the Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb was born in 1906 and received similar 
education as al-Banna (Gresh, 213). His ideology began when he was studying abroad 
in the United States and he witnessed American culture and was shocked at aspects 
such as mixed gender dances, which started his anti-Western sentiment. Sayyid Qutb 
actually joined the Muslim Brotherhood after al-Banna’s death. He became a member 
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after his return from the United States, where he studied educational administration. 
Qutb gradually assumed ideological leadership of the Brotherhood as he sought to 
refine al-Banna’s ideologies (Mideastweb). Qutb’s ideology radicalized the approach 
of some members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Sayid Qutb was one of the Islamists 
that were arrested during Nasser’s crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, his time 
spent in jail helped formulate his ideology. Like Hassan al-Banna, Qutb identified a 
problem, which was the “horrors, he witnessed in detention” (Vidino, 4), and decided 
that gradual reform was a process that was too slow. He also identified that foreign 
powers were making this process of gradual reform impossible as it was met by 
internal resistance by the government in addition to the external resistance. According 
to Qutb’s ideology, the Muslims that exist today are not truly Muslims because they 
are being ruled by manmade laws and as such they are living in jahili societies 
(Soage, 42). According to Qutb: 
“Either Islam or jahiliyya. There is no intermediate state half-Islam and half-
jahiliyya that Islam can accept. Islam clearly indicates that the truth is one, not 
multiple, that everything that is not truth is perdition, and that the two cannot 
be mixed. Either God’s government or jahiliyya government. Either God’s 
Shariah or human caprice.” (Qutb, 201) 
 
Qutb’s solution was for people to embrace the concepts of takfir and jihad. To 
Qutb, any ruler who was “refusing to implement Shariah and establish authentic 
Islamic states” would be declared a non-believer and have abandoned Islam (Vidino, 
4).  By takfir, the ruler would be declared a kafir and a non-believer and then those 
who wanted to establish an Islamic state, those who according to Qutb are “true” 
Muslims must overthrow and kill these rulers to achieve their goal of an Islamic state. 
According to Vidino, Qutb criticized the use of gradual reform through dawa, saying 
it cannot achieve the goal of an Islamic state as much as waging jihad using violent 
confrontation. Qutb was hanged in 1966, but through his death he was seen as a 
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martyr and his popularity was increased and groups from within the Muslim 
Brotherhood broke off to create other groups who would allocate Qutb’s approach to 
change. 
 Thinkers such as al-Banna and Qutb show how an individual can be very 
influential to launching a movement and affecting society. Within the main 
organization, the General Guide is also very influential to the group and its activities. 
Within the Muslim Brotherhood there were liberal members as well as more 
conservative members. This is a representation of the ideological divide which existed 
in the group. The first General Guide elected after Hassan al-Banna was Hasan al-
Hudaybi who brings the Brotherhood’s ideology back to its roots, by arguing that the 
purpose of the group has always been education as opposed to takfir and jihad and 
criticized using such methods because Muslims should not judge other Muslims 
(Vidino, 4). Al-Hudaybi’s work represented a move towards unity and his more 
liberal approach to the Muslim Brotherhood and its role in society. This liberal 
approach can be seen through his instance that the Secret Apparatus be dismantled as 
well as his clean break from the ideology of Sayid Qutb. Under the leadership of 
Umar al Tilmisani the group also shifted to a more accepting role in the Egyptian 
politics. This accepting role meant participating within Egyptian politics and running 
as independents as opposed to opposing the government. Despite these movements to 
lead the Muslim Brotherhood away from this radicalization and disbanding of the 
Secret Apparatus, the Brotherhood has not completely moved away from violence. 
According to Vidino, the Muslim Brotherhood still sees that violence can be a means 
to an end when achieving goals. This view is reflected in how the group supports 
violent organizations such as Hamas and suicide attacks in areas such as Palestine and 
Afghanistan, yet at the same time condoning groups such as al-Qaeda and its affiliated 
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groups. Newer members who are indoctrinated into the Muslim Brotherhood are 
taught the works of all these thinkers, and this can be conflicting due to the different 
ideologies, creating an ideological divide within the Muslim Brotherhood itself.   
3.3: The Muslim Brotherhood Under Nasser 
 The Muslim Brotherhood had a very active role in the build-up to the 1952 
Revolution. During the British colonial era there was a high anti-Western sentiment as 
the British were seen as the cause of socio-economic problems that Egypt was going 
through, this in return added to the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood with it 
being a social movement that provided goods and services to the people and opposed 
Western colonialism to a large degree by 1959, “the organization had over two 
thousand branches throughout Egypt and between 300,000 and 600,000 active 
members-the largest organized force in the country” (Munson, 489). In the 1952 
Revolution a group of officers led a coup against King Farouk and successfully 
removed the king from rule and took over. These officers would then be named the 
Free Officers and their movement would instigate a republic in Egypt and would 
cement the role of the military in politics. This coup was widely supported by the 
people and ushered an ear of social, political and economic reform.  
While there are no official records to prove the participation of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the coup, authors Ana Soage and J.F Frangnillio comment saying that 
“informed sources claim that the Muslim Brotherhood played a significant role in the 
coup” (Soage, 41). They also comment on the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in this 
coup saying that the military cooperated with the Muslim Brotherhood in order to 
successfully carry out this coup. They speculate that there was a possibility that 
Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat could have possibly been members of the 
Secret Apparatus. The Muslim Brotherhood used their grassroots support system in 
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order to mobilize people for the military.  
 There has been a long relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
state. During the initial years of the coup there is a change in the Muslim 
Brotherhood, instead of fighting the state, they cooperate with the Revolutionary 
Command Council, the group which was leading the post-revolutionary Egypt, in 
state building measures such as in negotiations about government formation. The first 
sign of the cooperation of the Muslim Brotherhood and the military occurred when in 
1953 all political parties were banned yet the ban on the Muslim Brotherhood was 
removed and the group was allowed to continue its actions as an organization. The 
banning of all parties can be seen as an attempt to promote unity and a failure of the 
previous political system to satisfy the needs of the people. The Muslim Brotherhood 
were also offered a part in the subsequent state building efforts. Sayid Qutb, a 
member of the Muslim Brotherhood was offered a position in the Liberation Rally. 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s relationship with the Free Officers deteriorated rapidly. 
Based on the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, their main focus was the role of 
religion in Egypt, and their solution to the widespread problems was the application 
of Shariah. The Muslim Brotherhood saw this as an opportunity and a tool to apply 
their version of an Islamic state. The state refused these requests and as such the 
Muslim Brotherhood returned to its position as opposition to the state. The Muslim 
Brotherhood began to openly demonstrate against the military. They were able to rally 
their supporters against the military with the demand of the “return to civilian rule” 
(Soage, 41). An important observation about this time in the history of the Muslim 
Brotherhood is whether the group would have protested if the state had agreed with 
their demands. These protests were in unison with the Communists which is 
conflicting because of their opposing views of the role of religion and state. 
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 The relationship reached its worst level when one of the members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood tried to assassinate President Gamal Abdel Nasser. By the time 
of this assassination attempt Nasser had consolidated power and made himself 
president. His nationalist based policies aimed at social equality combined with his 
humble middle class background and his charisma made him very popular amongst 
Egyptians. This assassination attempt only increased the popularity of Nasser and 
gave him the ability to be able to move against the Muslim Brotherhood. Nasser jailed 
and tortured thousands of the members of the Muslim Brotherhood and put them on 
trial. The regime prosecuted not just members but also leaders such as Hasan al-
Hudaybi, who was amongst those who received the death penalty, but his sentence 
was reduced to life in prison.  This move against the Muslim Brotherhood would be 
one of the most important developments in the movement a whole for several reasons. 
The first reason is that many of the members escaped these sentences and travelled to 
many countries around the world to countries such as Saudi Arabia and other Gulf 
countries. When they travelled they became members of the communities of the 
countries which they travelled to and became doctors and lawyers. These members 
began founding other chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood in other countries in the 
Middle East. This was very successful because of the nature of the ideology of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. The notion of social equality and piousness appealed to the 
largely Muslim populations. This turned the Egyptian movement into a global 
movement, one that surpassed Egyptian borders. 
 The other reason why this development was very important to the evolution of 
the Muslim Brotherhood is that it caused many of its members to go underground in 
fear of persecution. The imprisonment of many of the members produced many 
radical ideologies such as those of Sayid Qutb, who called for jihad against unjust 
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rulers. The Brotherhood went through several security clamp downs. In one of those 
authors Soage and Franganillo comment that Qutb’s book Ma’alim was so popular 
that it “was found in every house the police searched” (Soage, 42). This book was 
used as evidence against Qutb to prove that these Islamists were planning a coup. 
Despite the crackdown that was occurring on the Muslim Brotherhood had a large 
number of members estimated to be between 250,000 to 300,000 (Soage, 41). The 
crushing defeat of Egypt in the Six-Day War and Nasser’s subsequent attempt at 
resignation only helped increase the popularity of Nasser, yet at the same time 
Islamists used this defeat to say that it punishment from God for not following God’s 
laws (Soage, 42). This approach shows the groups use of religious rhetoric in politics, 
one of the defining characteristics and tactics used by the group. 
 Another important effect the Nasser era had on the Muslim Brotherhood is 
that it caused a divide within the group, because the newer members criticized the 
older members for their passiveness about dealing with Nasser’s crackdown and 
broke off the Muslim Brotherhood to create their own group which was inspired by 
Qutb’s idea. Sayid Qutb was executed and as such his followers considered him a 
martyr. The Nasser era shaped the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood and marked 
the beginning of them becoming a global movement and making them a banned group 
in Egypt and dissolved the group in 1952. 
3.4: The Muslim Brotherhood Under Sadat 
The period of the Muslim Brotherhood under the era of Sadat can be described 
as the comeback of the Muslim Brotherhood. When Sadat took over after Nasser, who 
died from a heart attack, he became a strong ruler which was a surprise because 
members of the Nasser regime assumed he was a general with a weak personality. 
This was beneficial for the RCC because it meant that Sadat would not challenge their 
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power. Yet when Sadat came to power what he did was marginalize the Nasserists as 
well as the socialists in his attempts to consolidate power. After those who saw that 
the loss in the Six Day War as a result of people straying away from God’s laws, 
Sadat had state controlled media refer to him as al-ra’is al-mu’min which translates to 
the pious one. This could be seen as an attempt by Sadat to gain more legitimacy after 
Nasser. Nasser was well known for being the people’s president as a source of his 
legitimacy; Sadat took the more religious oriented title in order to appeal to the people 
as well as to quell his Islamist opposition. Sadat had started attempts to democratise 
the country through releasing political prisoners which were imprisoned during the 
time of Nasser. These include the members of the Muslim Brotherhood who were 
freed and allowed to operate as opposition. This was a tactic as Mona al-Ghobashy 
explains it to de-Nasserize the state, as the Muslim Brotherhood ideology would 
balance out the socialist left. The Brothers were tolerated by the state to continue their 
charity projects but despite their attempts they would never become a legal political 
party.  
The role of religion in politics is very important during the term of Sadat, one 
important development in the relationship between the Muslim Brothers and the state 
is the addition of Article 2 in the constitution which stipulates that Islam is the 
religion of the state, this can be seen as an appeasement to the increasing parts of 
Egypt who were demanding the implementation of Islamic law, a sentiment that the 
Muslim Brotherhood used to their advantage to attract more supporters.  
 The Sadat era in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood helped shape the 
actions of the group for years to come. During the time of Sadat, Umar al-Tilmisani 
was appointed as the new General Guide and his philosophy was to cooperate with 
state politics. Authors Soage and Franganillo see the time under the leadership al-
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Tilmisani as one which “the Brothers recovered some of their prominence” (Soage, 
43). This can be credited to several reasons, one of which is that because under the era 
of Sadat the Muslim Brotherhood’s student movement expanded. With Sadat 
releasing the Muslim Brotherhood members from jail they were able to recruit new 
members from universities. These new members can be characterized as younger 
people who have legitimate criticisms of the regime such as Sadat’s attempt at 
democratization which was only partial, he allowed the release of some opposition to 
practice politics, but since it still included arresting members of the opposition who 
refused to work within the parameters he allowed them. These university students 
were lower class and were “disillusioned by the gap between their high expectations 
and the grim realities of the low-paying, unchallenging civil service positions to 
which they were consigned” (Cleveland, 382) This new generation were also less 
radical than previous generations as they were made up of more educated students, 
this made it possible for the organization to remerge after the damage that Nasser had 
done. Under the leadership of al-Tilmisani the Muslim Brotherhood would later on 
participate in elections such as parliamentary elections and union elections. First, the 
Muslim Brotherhood decided that political activity was essential for the application of  
its agenda and thus, fielded candidates in the national elections of 1941 and 1945 
(Stilt 77),  but they participated under the independent ticket in order to avoid getting 
arrested by the state. This was gradual participation in politics in order to stay off the 
radar of the regime and avoid confrontation. The Muslim Brotherhood also sought 
legal status while under Sadat, but due to the authoritarian nature of Sadat this would 
never happen. 
After the 6th of October War the popularity of Sadat increased, but it was short 
lived, because as soon as he agreed to sign the Camp David Treaty he was criticized 
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for cooperating with Israel. This issue was specifically important to the Muslim 
Brotherhood given how important the issue of Palestine was to the group’s ideology. 
This peace treaty had Sadat labelled as a traitor by his opposition. This launched the 
Qutbist segment of the Muslim Brotherhood who were made up of members “who 
were driven by a mixture of religious belief, social despair, and economic 
deprivation” (Cleveland, 382) these members of the jihadist faction “rejected the 
Sadat regime as impious and claimed that it was an Islamic duty to work for its 
overthrow and replacement by a government committed to the restoration of the 
Shariah” (Cleveland, 382). Sadat was also criticized for his infitah policy which did 
not benefit the poor. The Muslim Brotherhood capitalized on the unpopularity of these 
measures and due to their intricate support system of charities was to still increase the 
number of its members and sympathizers. The Muslim Brotherhood was able to use 
its newspaper al-Da’wa in order to openly criticize Sadat and his polices and mass 
distributed it to the people. 
 After the opposition kept increasing against Sadat, the president started a 
crackdown against opposition. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood were arrested as 
well as many of the secular opposition. This was due to Sadat transforming into an 
authoritarian ruler, despite his attempts at democratic reform. This can be seen as a 
way to ensure that people would not revolt against his infitah or open door policies. 
These measures were criticized as catering to the West as opposed to the people. The 
Bread Riots were seen as an example of how unpopular the measures were. When 
Sadat removed the bread subsidies there were mass riots marked by clashes with 
security and violence in Egypt which prompted Sadat to change the policy in the face 
of mass riots. The crackdown on Islamists along with the Sadat’s relationship with 
Israel was the breaking point in the relationship between the radicalized factions of 
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the Muslim Brotherhood which resulted in Sadat’s assassination on October 6th.  
  
3.5: Muslim Brotherhood Under Mubarak 
 The evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood under Mubarak is very important to 
understanding Muslim Brotherhood’s development which led their success in the 
January 25 Revolution. During the reign of Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood began 
fully participating in politics through elections. When Mubarak assumed power, he 
instilled the state of emergency, which allowed him to further consolidate power. 
Using the state of emergency is considered a legal tool in authoritarian regimes 
because it enables them to arrest opposition in the name of national security. It also 
meant that the state had the limit the right to assembly and freedom of speech. After 
the assassination of President Sadat by radical Islamists Mubarak instigated mass 
arrests of Muslim Brotherhood members using the state of emergency law as his 
justification. The state of emergency was not only used with the Islamists it was also 
used with the liberal, Mubarak “used the climate of crisis created by the radical 
insurgents in the 1990s to crack down on the moderates as well, arresting journalists 
and prominent individuals associated with the centrists, limiting their access to the 
media, and censoring their publications” (Cleveland, 545). The state of emergency 
directly affected the Muslim Brotherhood since the law affected the right to assembly, 
the society was unable to meet in order to elect its General Guide which led to a series 
of appointed leaders, effectively diminishing the “democratic” method within the 
society itself. In the 1980s, al-Tilmiasni convinced the Muslim Brotherhood to take 
another path than violence in order to fulfil their goals and ideology, as al-Tilmisani 
comments: 
“When we were released from the 1981 detention, we were in a state of near-
recession. We set to looking for a lawful means to carry out our activities without 
Al Khalifa  54 
troubling security or challenging the laws. Allah saw fit to find us a lawful way in the 
views of officials. The parliamentary session had just ended and thinking began on the 
new parliamentary elections. It was the opportunity of a lifetime, had the Ikhwan let it 
slip from their hands they would surely have counted among the ranks of the 
neglectful” (Al-Tilmisany, 212). 
 
In the next three decades the Muslim Brotherhood began accepting electoral 
politics and engaging in them in order to gain seats in syndicates and the People’s 
Assembly. This gradual participation in the elections helped shape the image of the 
Muslim Brotherhood as viable opposition not just simply organizers of charity 
projects. Mona El-Ghobashy describes the Brotherhood as “consummate political 
actors, neither extraordinary gifted at mobilization nor historically adept at deception” 
(El-Ghobashy, 374). This statement accurately explains the situation of the Brothers, 
yet what is extraordinary is their ability to survive three rulers who despite the best 
attempts at undermining them would still exist and evolve to bypass the laws of the 
state and survive to be the most organized group when Mubarak was deposed. It 
adopted three strategies to accomplish the following: the use of democratic process, 
which drew popular support from the public; the domination over student and 
professional unions by harnessing the democratic process; and the creation of social 
services networks that provided “food, jobs, healthcare and a sense of community to 
Egyptians” (Caromba and Solomon, 120).  
The first step that the Muslim Brotherhood took was through taking over the 
unions. The unions in Egypt are very important “they provide access to the job market 
and offer benefits such as loans, subsidized goods, and inexpensive health insurance” 
(Soage, 44). They were very successful in this venture and eventually would control 
many of the 24 unions such as the Student Union and the Doctor’s Union. This would 
be very helpful to the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood because it further added 
to their grassroots support and granted them access to considerable power. This would 
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help further their image as opposition to the regime who can offer goods and services 
that the government did not. According to authors Soage and Franganillio the Muslim 
Brotherhood while participating in this process, its criticisms undermine these efforts. 
These criticisms include their tactics at gaining votes such as through paying 
membership fees for all of its members who were participating in these unions. 
Another tactic that the Brothers were accused of included using religion in politics, by 
saying phrases such as “Are you giving your vote to God?” These tactics were illegal 
and can be seen as bribery in order to get more votes. The Brotherhood used these 
unions as a platform for their political ideas and gained more supporters. Through 
their participation in these unions any accomplishments that they had were credited to 
the movement as a whole, further gaining them more supporters.  
 The movement also expanded in participating in direct politics by running for 
seats in the People’s Assembly. Under the reign of Mubarak the Muslim Brotherhood 
would apply for a party several times but would never achieve one. In order to bypass 
the government’s state of emergency the Brotherhood would create alliances with the 
Wafd Party in order to get the opportunity to run for elections. In the 1984 elections 
they won eight seats in addition to two independent seats (Soage, 45). In the 1987 
elections the Muslim Brotherhood made alliances with ideologically weak parties in 
order to gain more power on the political scene to implement their own ideology and 
goals such as the implementation of Shariah (Soage, 45). An example of such a party 
is the Labour Party in which El-Ghobashy explains that there was a “progressive 
Islamization” through using slogans such as “Islam is the solution” (El-Ghobashy, 
379). This evolution in the Muslim Brotherhood shows how they evolve to meet the 
existing system in order to bypass state laws which are set against them in order to 
survive. In the parliamentary elections there is a crossover between the Brotherhood’s 
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participation in union elections and the results of the parliamentary elections. General 
Guide Mustafa Mashour comments on the results:  
“We must benefit from the experience of elections, for elections are an art with its 
own rules, expertise, and requirements, and we must push those who have given 
up on reforming the nation, push them to get rid of their pessimism and register to 
vote as soon as possible” (El-Ghobashy 380).  
 
This shows how the Brotherhood have evolved past their earlier years of 
political activities which involved violence on their part. The Muslim Brotherhood’s 
candidates are seen by the people as “accessible to the people of their constituency 
and the society candidates freely engaged with their local community” (Soage, 45). 
This shows how the Muslim Brotherhood succeeded in politics through their efforts 
of appealing to people by sending the image that they are active members of society 
and are a viable alternative to the state, which would gain them further popularity. 
Their participation in elections showed how strong the Muslim Brotherhood is and 
how it has the ability to mobilize its supporters against the ruling regime and actually 
win.  
 The society avoided a direct clash with the state in order to prevent further 
mass arrests. The Mubarak regime just like under Sadat tolerated the charity functions 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, in return for the society not crossing the regime’s “red 
lines” (Soage, 45). These red lines were considered anything that threatened the 
authority of the regime, but what the regime did not anticipate was the strength of the 
charity functions would have in solidifying the Muslim Brotherhood and gaining it 
more supporters. This also highlights the growing gap that was developing between 
the regime and the people, which the Muslim Brotherhood took full advantage of. 
Despite the warning the Muslim Brotherhood did clash with the state in the 1990 
elections when they boycotted the elections. The reason this caused problems for the 
regime was because it undermined their image in front of the world. Following this 
Al Khalifa  57 
there was a crackdown by the state as a response, through further curtailing the little 
freedom that the Brotherhood had through arresting members and raiding offices. 
Authors Soage and Franganillo comment on the incident in which in 1992 the 
government raided the offices of the Muslim Brotherhood in which they found 
documents which belonged to the Secret Apparatus which allegedly revealed plans of 
the society to infiltrate the government through unions. The government would use 
evidence such as this in a media war in order to discredit the organization, but with 
little success. In 1992, through the Lawyers Syndicate, the Brothers would manage to 
anger the state again and after their mass successes in the union elections the regime 
would pass a new syndicate law which would severely limit the participation of the 
Brothers effectively removing them from unions, and even with mass demonstrations 
the regime would oppose them violently (Soage, 48). This is a tactic the regime uses 
to control opposition, just like with the state of emergency, the Mubarak regime 
would use legal tactics to control the opposition and further help their own political 
gains. This tool would be effective as the Brother’s control of unions such as the 
student unions and the lawyers union would decrease.  
 The Brotherhood would compete again in the 1995 elections and would field 
170 candidates and only one would be elected and further disqualified (Soage, 48). 
One important observation of elections to come is that they become filled with 
independent candidates which suggest how little political parties were accepted, 
further showing authoritarian tactics that were taken by the regime to consolidate 
power. Authors Soage and Franganillo comment saying that these elections were the 
“most corrupt and violent since Mubarak became president” (Soage, 48). The 
violence was also another tactic taken by the regime to intimate and scare opposition 
away. The Muslim Brotherhood’s was not only participating through politics to gain 
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supporters, they were also continuing their charity services the most important 
example was the 1992 earthquake in which the society was very well organized and 
was able to help many people in need, further showing the incompetence of the 
government and increasing their image as viable opposition.  
 The Muslim Brotherhood under the reign of Mubarak was also going through 
deep ideological changes. The three decades were marred with ideological splits and 
internal divide as a result, all of which help develop the group further. The society’s 
acceptance of electoral politics conflicted with the initial ideology of its creator 
Hassan al-Banna who thought that party politics lead to disunity in the state, and 
within the group there existed a group which wanted to continue this belief, but the 
group had to evolve to suit the developments that society which was democratic 
transition. According to scholar Mona El-Ghobashy there were deep ideological 
conflicts within the group because of the generational gaps that existed between the 
members in the organization. According to her that one aspect of the conflict in 
ideology stems from the different generations, the older generation which she 
describes as the “older prison generation” and the younger generation. This can be 
very important for the development as internal conflicts can lead to reform in 
ideology. A change in ideology came with the group’s participation in elections where 
they began to explain democracy through Islamic terms. These include things such as 
comparing the Prophet’s principle of Shura to democratic institutions such as the 
People’s Assembly and the Shura Council. This is a bridge of generations and a 
reformation of ideology for the group as it evolves to adapt in a world where electoral 
democracy is one of the accepted forms of political participation.    
 In the period of 1995 to 2000 there were ideological conflicts within the group 
due to the inability of the older generation of accepting many of the reforms that were 
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needed for the group to change its image. One such example was when Mustafa 
Mashour a supporter of the Secret Apparatus released a statement in support of an 
Islamic state; Copts should be barred from higher political posts and should also pay 
jizya which is a special tax that Christians would pay for protection by the state (El-
Ghobashy, 386). This represents the differences in ideology that exists within the 
group. The divide resulted in a serious split within the Muslim Brotherhood in which 
group of the younger generation wanted to create their own party. The youth felt that 
the older generations were making decisions that were not in the best of the group and 
felt that they were holding on to ideas such as distrust of the multiparty system. The 
younger generation also disagreed with many of the main ideas and notions of the 
group such as the source of authority which the youth felt should be popular 
sovereignty and the older generation felt it should be Shariah. All these differences 
eventually led to members submitting the application to create a new party called 
Hizb al-Wasat. The members that submitted this application were effectively kicked 
out of the group because they did not do this with the permission of the General 
Guide, which directly conflicts with the concept of loyalty within the group (Soage, 
49). This change represented an evolution within the group, which is that the ideology 
is reforming generation by generation and in effect this will change the way the 
society deals with politics. This application was denied, and many members which 
had initially supported this venture returned to the group, others maintained their 
ideas.  An important part of the ideological change in the Muslim Brotherhood 
occurred in 2004 under Mahdi Akif the General Guide at the time in which he 
released a manifesto that explain the position of the Muslim Brotherhood on several 
issues such as equality between Copts and Muslims, offering “Islam as a solution to 
the moral crisis provoked by the neglect of traditional values and Western influence” 
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(Soage, 50). The manifesto also spoke of the Brothers complete support of democracy 
and all its institutions, these changes represented a new beginning for the society and 
portray how the ideology has evolved from its initial creation. These ideas show how 
the Muslim Brotherhood evolved in order to participate in politics. This can also be 
seen as a continuation of their gradual reform policy, through working on the ground 
level through charity activities and also working through politics to try to bring 
change, but these efforts were hampered by the regime.  
The state was beginning to feel threatened by the Muslim Brotherhood and 
their increasing popularity. After the war on Iraq in which all countries in the Middle 
East began instigating reforms towards democracy in fear of American military 
intervention. The 2005 elections won the Muslim Brotherhood 88 seats in the 
People’s Assembly which caused fear for the regime about the rising popularity of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Another development by the regime to curtail the participation 
of the society was in 2007 when the People’s Assembly passed a law which 
specifically banned the use of Islam in a political context and the “possibility of 
excluding independent candidates from running elections” (Soage, 51). This is 
another way in which the regime used legal tactics to contain the opposition. This 
particular development would be detrimental to the success of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, since they primarily ran as independents. They also further extended the 
state of emergency which would also give the regime the opportunity to keep 
arresting opposition. All these events can be understood by looking at events in the 
region such as Hamas winning the Palestinian legislative elections in 2006 which the 
regime directly responded to by ensuring that similar results would not happen to 
Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood reacted through releasing statements against the 
regime. In 2007, as a result of increasing popularity of Brotherhood candidates 
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challenging Mubarak for the presidency, the despot instituted sweeping constitutional 
reforms that vested upon him the authority to disband parliament, prohibit religious 
political parties, “weaken judicial oversight of elections, and grant the government 
new security powers” (Caromba and Solomon 120). The regime continued to curtail 
the opposition until the 2010 parliamentary elections in which the regime won an 
overwhelming majority through corrupt means such as police intimidation and ballot 
rigging. Allegations of massive electoral fraud began circulating in the country. 
Ultimately, the Brotherhood joined forces with all of the opposition parties that 
participated in the election and announced a boycott of the 2010 parliamentary 
elections. As a result, the NDP, underestimating the strength of the Muslim 
Brotherhood managed to lose a considerable amount of seats, only gaining 80% of the 
seats (Angrist) . This continued repression only fuelled the popularity of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood and the regime helped shape each other. The 
authoritarian tactics of the regime helped show the Muslim Brotherhood in a light that 
made them look as fighters for democracy, in return increasing their popularity and 
credibility. As a result, the Mubarak regime continually tried to discredit the 
Brotherhood by depicting the group as a radical Islamist group that would send back 
Egypt to the practices of the Middle Ages which increased the fear of the people from 
Muslim Brotherhood and avoid voting for the Brothers to prevent the results. All 
these crimes committed by regime eventually resulted in the 2011 Revolution against 
corruption, demanding democracy.  
The Muslim Brotherhood and the State 
 The Muslim Brotherhood developed under the several regimes and has 
adapted to survive. This evolution from a charitable, dawa based organization to a 
political movement. According to scholar Bruce K. Rutherford, the Brotherhood 
Al Khalifa  62 
would achieve its goals through four main tactics, missionary work, education, 
indoctrination and actions such as building mosques, schools, and social service 
clinics. The relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the state is a very 
complex one. The authoritarian regimes of Egypt have cracked down and relaxed on 
the practices of the group depending on their own needs and interests. Nasser use the 
group against British, and then cracked down on the group to consolidate his power. 
Sadat used the group to balance the influence of the Soviets and then allowed them 
limited activity. Mubarak was harsher than Sadat with the treatment of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and yet he allowed them to participate in elections and run as 
independents.  
 Both the Muslim Brotherhood and the authoritarian regimes helped shape each 
other. The Muslim Brotherhood’s image was shaped by the media of the regime, 
showing them as terrorists as well as phrasing the political scene to the people as 
either the regime or chaos under the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood 
helped highlight the regime as being harsh and stifling. The Muslim Brotherhood also 
utilized its resources abroad to publish works on Islam and governance to help spread 
their doctrine. These resources have helped highlight the political goals of 
establishing a form of Islamic constitutionalism. Rutherford contends that the phrase 
in of itself is very vague in its details in how to govern. This observation becomes 
very obvious in the post 2011 Egypt, where after the Brotherhood gained power came 
the trouble in finding what the role Islam plays in governance and in the constitution.  
 
 
 
Chapter 4: The Muslim Brotherhood after the 2011 Revolution  
4.1: January 25, 2011: Revolution  
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The January 2011 Revolution took the world by surprise and brought the end 
of what was thought as one of the strongest authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. 
Young activities employed tools such as social media to begin gathering support for 
mass protests that they planned for January 25, 2011. The protests were organized by 
several groups, amongst the most significant was Google Inc.'s Middle East and North 
Africa marketing division’s executive, Wael Ghonim, who encouraged people to 
assemble at Tahrir Square. Ghoneim was the creator of the Facebook group "We Are 
All Khaled Saeed". This group was created in order to bring to light the case of 
activist Khaled Saeed who was killed as a result of police brutality and whose 
perpetrators were never brought to justice. The use of social media in the 2011 
Revolution would prove essential to launch many of the movements that organized 
the 2011 Revolution. Internet and social media websites such as Twitter and Facebook 
gave activists the outlet necessary to meet other activists with similar ideas, debate 
ideas, and gain new information. These outlets were impossible for the regime to 
completely monitor which enabled a section of society to be more politically aware 
and exposed to global notions such as democracy and peaceful resistance. The 
protesters were mostly young people, who had been actively using social networking 
sites Twitter and Facebook to encourage each other activists with similar interests in 
their issues to take to the streets and protest. 
Emboldened by the success in the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia, the 
organizers who in return spread the plan to those who had no access to computer or 
Internet and as such hundreds of thousands of people took to the street in the 25th of 
January with the basic demand of an end to police brutality, no to the illegal inheriting 
of power from Mubarak to his son Gamal Mubarak, and the demand for social justice. 
Dictatorial regimes have a difficulty of keeping a nation under its control when most 
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of the other governments in the world are elected and have limited number of years to 
stay in service (Britannica para 3). Authoritarian regimes such as Mubarak had to deal 
with the issue of globalization in which ideas such as democracy would spread fast 
and helping increase awareness of the population increasing the difficulty of the 
regime keeping control. Some sectors of society will soon realize the necessary need 
to change the regime in order to address current social conditions, which they viewed 
as not being equal or just. As an authoritarian regime, Mubarak controlled most of the 
decisions of the state and used his security apparatus to enforce them. And the control 
that Mubarak delegated he gave to a close group of people he trusted to keep his 
interests and in return they reaped the benefits. The government was notoriously 
corrupt and nepotistic, with much wealth and power distributed among Mubarak’s 
immediate family and close allies. This prevented the trickle effect from occurring 
resulting in only a certain segment of society benefitting which led to an increasing 
gap between the rich and the poor, high levels of unemployment poor services such as 
health services and education services because many of the individuals responsible 
were corrupt (Matchett). At that time, it was the Brotherhood that would continually 
provide the much needed social services for the people. In return, the Brotherhood 
would be building its solid support base, first from the masses, eventually 
incorporating a broad alliance of professionals helping increase the good image of the 
group in front of society. The discontent over the dire situation was increasing over 
the span of the rule of Mubarak. The fear factor in the general population prevented 
the events to happen earlier and with no clear leaders, the grievances kept increasing. 
With the 2011 Revolution the opportunity arose that they would have to make their 
grievances heard (Tadros, 2013). 
Late into January 2011, Washington and the rest of the world acknowledged 
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that Egypt was under authoritarian rule, and despite what was occurring on ground, it 
maintained that the regime was stable. The regime that was ruling it for many decades 
remained in power and seemed to be able to control its people and the events in the 
country without difficulty. To many states and scholars such as Michele Angrist 
everything appeared in order in the country, as there were no indications that a radical 
change was going to occur. Angrist, in her evaluation of the authoritarian trends in the 
Middle East in her book Politics and Society in the Contemporary Middle East, 
written before the Arab Spring, concluded that there seems to be no signs of a radical 
change to disrupt the status quo in the Middle East. Egypt’s powerful regime did not 
appear to be weakening and the security apparatus seemed to be successful in tamping 
signs of aggravated discontent over those who were in power for so long. Mubarak 
was believed to be staying in power indefinitely, just like some dictators in the Arab 
world (Britannica para 6). 
The determination of these young activists resulted in speedy triumph and 
enflamed optimism that finally, the Middle East could take part in an increasingly 
democratic world, something that they could only hear about in other nations (Trager, 
114). The initial phase of the 18 days Mubarak tried to use his security apparatus to 
once again tamp down the discontent, but was ultimately unsuccessful resulting in the 
police withdrawing from the street and the deployment of the military to establish 
control in the country. The military sided with the people and promised to not shoot 
them further isolating Mubarak. Mubarak has tried to have the internet connection 
shut off, thinking it would disrupt their organization but he failed because by then the 
activists used other methods to organize and gained the sympathy of a large portion of 
the country who had similar concerns, resulting in 18 days of protests and sit in that 
brought the country to a standstill. The protests started with a certain segment of 
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society, the Muslim Brotherhood did not participate in the initial days in fear that the 
movement would fail and anger the regime against them in addition to the 
government security department had threatened to place the Supreme Guide, 
Mohammed Badie, under arrest if any of the Brothers joined in the protests (Trager 
114), something they would be heavily criticized for when they would later 
participate and try to take credit. After it became clear that this was not simply a 
movement, but a revolution they used their extensive grassroots support as well as 
organizational abilities to gain the movement even more supporters. However, on the 
second day of the demonstrations, the Guidance Office felt compelled to give in to the 
requests of its younger members to take part in the protests. This showed again the 
generational gap that existed within the group because the youth felt that this 
movement for democracy is essential, but the older generations were more 
conservative. The Muslim Brotherhood thus, made participation obligatory for the 
planned January 28 demonstration, which was also referred to as “Friday of Rage” 
(Trager 114). Using the hierarchical communication system, the Brothers were able to 
join en masse in the protest, despite the absence of online communication. They used 
telephones instead to reach people and those who were against the oppressions that 
the Mubarak government was doing sought support not only from political 
oppositionist, but also from everyone else. After a week Mubarak appeared on 
national television announcing that he had asked the government to submit its 
resignation but he will stay in power (Parks para 8) a compromise seen as too little 
too late and the civil unrest peaked and the ceiling of demands increased and Mubarak 
tried to remain defiant by refusing to resign; demonstrators rebelled against curfews. 
The protesters then came to demand that the president himself resign, but despite 
increasing anger he expressed that he intended to stay in power giving further 
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concessions believing that such concessions were enough to pacify the people. 
Finally, on February 11, Mubarak resigned and handed power to the Supreme 
Council of Egypt’s armed forces. It was seen as a victory for democracy movements 
around the world and emboldened even more Middle Eastern countries into following 
suit, however; as proven later, the road towards real democratic change was not going 
to be an easy trail for the Egyptians. The damage done to Egyptian society has been 
systemic and there are no easy antidotes for such deep-seated social ills. Bits and 
pieces of the old regime were still there, the Interior Ministry had the same people and 
the security apparatus which can be considered a victim of the regime still used the 
same brutal tactics that caused people to revolt in the first place, and most other 
Mubarak henchmen were still in secured positions. The country was now under 
military rule and the promised six months of interim rule was already looking very 
difficult. One of the largest problems left by the Mubarak regime was the difficult task 
of achieving social justice and closing the gap between the rich and the poor. By the 
time Mubarak resigned from the presidency, he was estimated to have a net worth of 
$5 billion (Baram para 5). Most of this fortune is saved up in offshore accounts, and 
invested in prime real estate. The Mubarak family accumulated its wealth through 
partnerships with foreign firms that invested in Egypt, wherein foreign investment 
was welcome except that a local partner (or sponsor) had to have a 51% stake in the 
investment (Baram para 11). Mubarak’s close circle and immediate family members 
were typically the sponsors or partners, while millions of Egyptians starved and 
wallowed in unemployment. By the time he stepped down, 50% of Egyptian men did 
not have jobs and 90% of women stayed jobless (Baram para 14). Mubarak and his 
henchmen's control of many of the state’s resources showed how levels of corruption 
were very high resulting in mismanagement of resources and abuse of power 
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depleting the economy’s sources.  
 
4.2: An Overview of the 2011 Revolution through Crane Brinton’s The Anatomy of 
Revolution 
 Crane Brinton provides as different theory into further understanding how 
revolutions affect societies. The Egyptian Revolution may be understood better 
through the work of Crane Brinton that compared the British, American, French and 
Russian revolutions. Written in 1938, the book has been very influential with scholars 
with the theory holding true to date. In Brinton's The Anatomy of Revolution, a 
revolution is defined to be a “drastic, sudden substitution of one group in charge of 
the running of a territorial political entity by another . . .” (Brinton, 4). It is compared 
to a disease with an accompanying high fever, a condition in which the body tries to 
re-establish the original condition; so it is with societies in which attempts are made 
to restore things back to its original state prior to the revolution, the main reason why 
revolutions are unable to achieve many revolutionary goals. It differs from a disease 
as symptoms may have been present for generations. Frequently, revolutions begin 
with moderation (Rule of the Moderates) and become a crisis in which the most 
violent revolutionaries dominate (Reign of Terror) (Brinton, 17).  The crisis is 
followed by convalescence in which the society can be immunized from the same 
attacks, they are stronger, but in no way entirely remade. Brinton claims that the 
revolutions of the English, French and Russian had similar trajectories, fighting their 
ruling classes; the Americans fought against British policies. 
The author forwards that ideas form part of equally dependent variables that 
result to revolutions, “no ideas, and no revolution” (Brinton, 49). Brinton talks about 
class divisions and antagonisms and of a government who continually tries to milk its 
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reluctant citizenry. He also forwards that a revolution only becomes a revolution when 
the armed forces have been won over (Brinton, 89). He then discusses the roles of 
moderates and extremist, the moderates first take control followed by the radicals, a 
strongman takes charge and things go back to moderation. Enthusiasm for religion, 
ritual, organization and ideas appear tied up with “economic and political aims, with a 
program to change things, institutions, laws, not just to convert people” (Brinton, 
186). Some abuses committed in the old regime as well as certain institutions are 
removed, but others are slightly changed; government machineries work better after 
the revolution (Brinton, 239). Such revolutions leave a successful revolt tradition and 
are followed in other parts of the world. 
 
4.3: The Muslim Brotherhood and Elections 
 Before the resignation of Mubarak, the political scene in Egypt was severely 
damaged. Mubarak used his state apparatus to intimidate political opposition and the 
state of emergency to prevent the legal development of political parties made 
opposition weak in Egypt.  After the fall of the Mubarak regime the political actors in 
Egypt achieved the right to be able to form legal parties. The Muslim Brotherhood 
was given the opportunity to create their own party for the first time since their 
creation. This step in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood marks great significance 
in the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood. The initial philosophy of Hassan al 
Banna was against the party politics that existed during the time of its creation, 
because it caused disunity in Egyptian society. This mentality existed within the group 
and those older generations opposed the creation of a party. This internal conflict 
shows the diversity of mentalities within the Muslim Brotherhood and how that does 
affect the pragmatic nature of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
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 After the fall of Mubarak a review of the political parties law was made which 
symbolized the beginnings of an actual democratic multiparty system, an essential 
characteristic of a democracy. The review of the party law included a main stipulation 
in which a party’s “principles, platforms, methods of operation and choice of 
leaderships and members a party may neither be based on religion, class, sect, 
profession or geography, nor be established on account of gender, language, religion 
or creed” (Lehmann) yet despite that the Muslim Brotherhood submitted its papers in 
which it stated that it is in fact a “civil” party which allowed for the application to be 
accepted. The Muslim Brotherhood formed the Freedom and Justice Party. The 
creation of the Freedom and Justice Party caused fear amongst other parties because it 
brought back memories of previous elections where the Muslim Brotherhood was able 
to gain enough support to win a significant number of seats in the parliament even 
with the legal obstacles placed by the regime, and with the political scene in Egypt 
still not fully developed other parties feared that they would not be properly 
represented in the new parliament, a fear that would in fact turn out to be substantial 
as the next year to come would “soon gave way to an Islamist tsunami that prevailed 
at every electoral contest held in the past two and a half years” (Tadros 2013). 
 With the upcoming elections it became evident that the generational gap was 
leaning in favour of those who supported running for elections as opposed to those 
who wanted to stay with the old traditions and notions of al-Banna. These younger 
generations as Lorenzo Vidino points out have “complained about the rigid hierarchy 
of the organization and their exclusion from its upper elections” (Vidino, 6). The 2011 
Revolution caused an internal split where these younger generations participated 
despite the leadership not doing so.  Like previous phases in history, the Muslim 
Brotherhood also had to adapt to this new phase through new tactics and reform. The 
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most significant development is the ideological changes that the group went through 
in order to adapt to the new phase of politics. In this instance the Brotherhood was 
faced with the reality of adopting its ideology into a platform which there was a 
significant chance that they would have the opportunity to implement it. In 2004, the 
Brotherhood drafted the Initiative of the Muslim Brotherhood on Principles of Reform 
in Egypt. This document encompasses generalized statement of goals envisioned for 
Egyptian society by the Muslim Brotherhood. In 2005, the Electoral Program of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, was issued in anticipation of the in the lower parliamentary 
house, and in 2007, a similar document was issued prior to the elections of the upper 
parliamentary house (Stilt, 84). Most significant of all these documents is the 2007 
Draft Platform of the Political Party, which is referred to simply as the “Platform” 
(Stilt, 84). The platform can be seen as a compromise as well because it includes 
aspects of human rights to help gain the trust of the younger members, while at the 
same time  it includes Islamic components are as an attempt to appeal to core and 
long-time supporters. The Brotherhood, in its documents, makes it clear that it has no 
intention of imposing a theocracy and it also recognize Egypt to be a civil state. They 
make this opinion a core of their 2011 Platform in which they state that: 
“The State is civil and civilian, for the Islamic State is civilian in nature. It is not 
a military state ruled by armed forces who get in power by military coups, and it 
is not ruled like a dictatorship, nor is it a police state controlled by the security 
forces, nor is it a theocracy -governed by the clergy or by Divine Right. There 
are no infallible people who can monopolise the interpretation of the Holy 
Koran and have exclusive right to legislation for the nation and are 
characterised by Holiness.” (Freedom and Justice) 
 
It is just clear that the group sees a larger role for religion in politics and seeks 
to reform the system to reform state institutions to accept such an ideology. Before the 
2007 Platform, the Brotherhood was careful not to dwell on the role that Islamic law 
should play in state politics. The Platform, which is much lengthier and is more 
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detailed, finally explains party positions if they were given the chance to legitimately 
participate in Egyptian politics. It pledges support to the Egyptian constitution and has 
no plans of replacing it (Stilt, 87). This is a development from previous documents 
that showed some members having disagreements with the constitution and would 
like it replaced. 
This change in ideology has long been coming but in the face of elections the 
Muslim Brotherhood formulated a new platform in order to face this new phase of 
Egyptian politics where they would have to reconcile their previous ideology in order 
to formulate a new one. Issues such as the role of religion in politics, the role of 
women and Copts as well as the question of democracy would have to be clearly 
addressed. The earlier 2005 electoral program addresses several of these ideological 
developments that the Muslim Brotherhood reached; it stipulates that a religious 
political power is not a tenet of the religion of Islam. The state as conceived in Islam 
takes the form of a civil state where the system is determined by the community in 
which Islamic law defines the framework of fixed norms. The same type of rhetoric 
appear in the 2007 Platform; however, given that the Brotherhood itself has internal 
divisions, the conservative stance adopted points to the dominance of the conservative 
in writing the final draft. When it was published and was spread through the internet; 
it drew criticism and the Brotherhood promised to revise it. The Platform starts on the 
purposes (maqasid) with very general statements; this concerns the Islamic Sharia, 
“stated as the protection of religion, life, honor, reason, and property form the 
Brotherhood’s guiding policies in determining its goals, strategies, and policies” 
(Stilt, 91). The language can be compared to the platform which was released in 2011, 
where it was filled with notions of aspects such as human rights and equal citizenship. 
This terminology reflects the younger generations how were from the student 
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movement during Sadat’s era and the youth under Mubarak’s era, who were less of 
hardliners and were more concerned with issues such as human rights. The rhetoric is 
seen as a form of assurance to the world that the Muslim Brotherhood is ready to 
engage in democracy.  
 The FJP would be a reflection of the main ideology of the Muslim 
Brotherhood on issues such as the application of Shariah in the state in which the new 
platform explains that “the State envisaged in our program is the national 
constitutional Islamic modern democracy, based on Sharia (Islamic law) as a frame of 
reference. By its nature, Sharia nurtures aspects of faith, worship and morality, and 
also regulates various aspects of life for Muslims and their non-Muslim partners in the 
homeland” (Freedom and Justice Party). This is an example of how ideology is 
evolved, although this can be criticized by the notion of how the application of 
Shariah should be. The issue of Shariah is very important to the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s goals because it represents how they intend to reinstitute religion in the 
lives of people.  
 Anther ideological issue that the Muslim Brotherhood would face is its stance 
on issues such as democracy. During the beginning of the revolution optimists viewed 
the Muslim Brotherhood as a “religiously conservative yet democratic leaning 
movement that has undergone significant changes throughout history and has reached 
maturity” (Vidino, 8). This maturity can be seen as the lessons learned from previous 
experiences which were discussed previously in this study. The organization, has 
reached the point where it “fully rejects violence and engages in democratic 
processes” (Vidino, 8). Although pessimists would view that the group simply 
adopted these methods as an elaborate tactic as a means to an end, which is coming to 
power in order to have the change that they seek. In the post 2011 Egypt the Muslim 
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Brotherhood has renounced violence in fact and has participated in all the methods of 
democracy in order to gain as many seats as possible. But even though their original 
motto was “participation not domination” critics would argue that while they may not 
have gone after the exact majority they have in fact ensured that their voice would be 
the most dominant one in institutions such as the Shura Council and the People’s 
Assembly.  
 The Muslim Brotherhood has always kept a motto when it came to politics 
which is “participation not domination”. This motto indicates that they are aware of 
the support that they have in society and their ability to harness this support towards 
elections. When elections and campaigning started a segment of society were still 
afraid of the Muslim Brotherhood and this can largely be credited to the image that 
the previous regime had used to describe. They were commonly referred to as 
terrorists and more often than not the regime would use this image to scare voters to 
voting for the regime. Many scholars would point out all evidence points out that the 
Muslim Brotherhood was “changing, or indeed had changed, into a modern political 
movement” (Abrams). He also explains that the environment the group was 
participating in would once again force it to moderate through “it’s very participation 
in the democratic process would moderate it or, in the worst circumstances, it would 
be forced to moderate due to the burdens of governance and a failing economy” 
(Abrams).  There are many reasons that can explain the reason that they take this 
gradual position when it comes to political participation. One of those reasons is that 
they want to maintain the image of a party which participates with other emerging 
parties. On some level it could also be deduced that the Freedom and Justice Party 
wanted to distance themselves from the mistakes that were previously made by 
Mubarak’s National Democratic Party which sought to dominate every election. Other 
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explanations of scholars such as Nathan Brown explain that this is descriptive of the 
state in which Egypt was in. The “hazy and unsettled rules” (Brown) make it difficult 
for one actor to completely be in control of the scene.  During its initial campaigning 
for Egypt’s scholar Nathan Brown comments saying that it “plunged into politics with 
unprecedented enthusiasm, focusing all of its energies and impressive organizational 
heft on the parliamentary vote” (Brown).  In its initial campaigning the group would 
explain that it is in fact not seeking a majority but is seeking one-third of the 
parliamentary seats. In response to fears that the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and 
Justice Party would win a majority of the seats opposition leaders would respond 
saying that they do not comprise the majority of the Egyptian population and that 
notion would not be likely. Yet despite these assertions the FJP was able to win 235 
seats or what translates to 47.2% of the seats in parliament, when combined with the 
conservative Salafi party the Al-Nour Party who won 121 seats or 24.3%, the political 
Islam ideology was able to win the clear majority of seats in the new parliament. 
These results while they came surprising to members of the opposition should not be 
entirely surprising. In order to understand the results of the FJP it is important to study 
the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the build-up to the elections and the 
environment they were competing in. 
 The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party would claim more than 
the seats it had said it would run for which created fears for the liberal opposition who 
saw this as a sign of the beginning of the Brotherhood controlling the political scene 
in Egypt and effectively excluding them. Unlike other political groups in Egypt the 
Muslim Brotherhood has been functioning for decades in which it focused on welfare 
to cover the needs which were ignored by the state. The Muslim Brotherhood could 
have won much more seats but it chose to not do so, which is an indication of them 
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looking towards cementing their role the future of Egyptian politics. This can be 
perceived in several ways, the first being that the Muslim Brotherhood despite 
claiming it would run for only one third of the seats, it ran for and won for under half 
of the seats in parliament. This can be compared to the days of the Mubarak regime 
where the members of the NDP would essentially run and dominate the parliament. 
The first parliamentary elections after the revolution would be very important to the 
Muslim Brotherhood in order to finally be able to achieve their political goals that 
they have been working towards for decades. Doing well in the first parliamentary 
elections would enable the Brotherhood powers such as the ability to select the new 
speaker of the parliament, but arguably the most important repercussion of doing well 
in the parliamentary elections is controlling a large stake in the selection of the people 
on the committee which drafts the constitution. In understanding why the Muslim 
Brotherhood did so well in these elections one must only look towards the decades of 
work which the organization has been building. The first reason to explain why the 
Freedom of Justice Party achieved so many seats in the elections is because it was 
associated with all the charity work which the organization controls. In the mind of 
the average Egypt these short term social services are seen as tangible change that is 
credited to the organization and voters would vote in hopes of these being applied on 
the state as a whole. The Muslim Brotherhood “runs numerous institutions, including 
hospitals, schools, banks, businesses, foundations, day care centres, thrift shops, 
social clubs, and facilities for the disabled” (Laub). These projects which the Muslim 
Brotherhood used to help the people would instil a sense of loyalty in the people 
causing them to vote for the FJP. The implications of these charity services also 
contribute to reasons why the Muslim Brotherhood did so well in the elections. The 
financials it takes to run such wide scale services shows how well funded the Muslim 
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Brotherhood is and its ability to fund the campaigns of its members that it chose to 
field. This level of organization, be it through loyalty of members in society who have 
benefited from the Muslim Brotherhood or their extensive funds, is much more 
advanced than that of the opposition, automatically placing them in the forefront of 
elections. 
 Another reason explaining why the FJP did well in elections is the state of the 
opposition at the time of elections. As mentioned earlier in the study, the Muslim 
Brotherhood has been functioning for decades providing goods and services for the 
people and with that they have slowly been introducing themselves as viable 
opposition the more they are able to occupy the area which the state ignores by 
ignoring the segment of society which has been long ignored. This speaks of the 
power of the Muslim Brotherhood which is building connections which ultimately 
translated to voter confidence. Carnegie scholar Thomas Carothers characterizes the 
opposition as “Cairo-centric elites who cannot be bothered to devote time and energy 
to build sustainable grassroots bases and party networks” (Carothers). This is the 
strength of the Muslim Brotherhood which is its ability to go to the villages and get 
the support of the people. Carothers comments that these liberal parties “waste too 
much time and energy and squabbling with each other over petty issues for the sake of 
meaningless political advantages rather than trying to solve the country’s problems in 
a constructive, cooperative way” (Carothers). This is also reflective of a strength in 
the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood as well as a weakness. The strength of 
this quality is that the Muslim Brotherhood and by extension the FJP has no need to 
formulate any connections with other parties for the sake of gaining seats because it is 
a very strong grassroots movement which can rely on its supporters in its time of 
need. The weakness appears in the practice of politics, which is that no party can rely 
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strictly on itself in order to govern it must form coalitions and negotiate with other 
parties. The formation of these grassroots support also is a strength of the Muslim 
Brotherhood who’s candidates are seen as accessible to the people and have been seen 
by the voters before, thus establishing a connection, unlike the opposition who “only 
become active during election time when they come looking for [a person’s] vote; the 
rest of the time [they] are never hear[d] from” (Carothers).  
 An important argument made about the Muslim Brotherhood is that they have 
been elected through free and fair elections, but this claim can ultimately refuted on 
the grounds that while they were free where anyone can chose the candidate they 
wanted, these elections though were not fair. The lack of fairness can be seen when 
comparing the status of the opposition to that of the Muslim Brotherhood. The charity 
services of the Muslim Brotherhood can also be seen as a form of bribery because 
people would be voting for the candidates on the grounds of bribes offered. Such 
examples include a report by Leila Fadel explaining how: 
 “In a poor district of eastern Cairo on Friday, families crowded outside the 
neighbourhood mosque as volunteers for the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice 
party yelled out prices on discounted potatoes, lemons, green beans and other 
vegetables. Sewage ran through potholed streets, and garbage was piled high. Many 
families in the neighbourhood share one-room dwellings that serve as their kitchen, 
bedroom and living room.” (Fadel) 
 
The author explains that during an interview of a woman who bought some of the 
cheaper produce “she will likely vote for the party” (Fadel). Through looking at this 
argument it becomes apparent as one of the reasons which led for this parliament 
ultimately was dissolved and the ultimate ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood from 
power. The Muslim Brotherhood applied the same tactics when it came to the 
presidential elections, relying on the support of its members and the dismal state of 
the opposition, who could not unite their votes for a common candidate, to gain more 
supporters. The Freedom and Justice Party fielded the president of its party Mohamed 
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Morsi who won the first round of elections along with Ahmed Shafik a retired air 
marshal as well as the last prime minister under President Hosni Mubarak. Mohamed 
Morsi won the second round of elections becoming the first elected president of 
Egypt.  There are several reasons when understanding why people would vote for 
him. Many of the people voted for Mohamed Morsi because he was the candidate of 
the FJP, which once again mobilized to get people to vote for him. The Muslim 
Brotherhood was able to once again translate its mass organizational skills to help its 
own candidate who was the president of the FJP in order to help him win. The results 
of the elections were a shock everywhere because the candidate of the Brotherhood 
won by a small difference, 1%. This showed how the Muslim Brotherhood were 
possibly starting to lose some of their support on the ground as the officials were 
elected to office and their constituents were beginning to realize that the Brotherhood 
were not living up to their promises. The presidential elections left revolutionaries 
with a dilemma of voting between a candidate representing the old regime and a 
candidate represented the Muslim Brotherhood which by the time presidential 
elections had controlled a large portion of the People’s Assembly and controlled a 
58% of the Shura council. This contradicted their original principle of “participation 
not domination”. When breaking down the reasons behind voting for the candidate of 
the Muslim Brotherhood it becomes apparent that many of the people voted for him in 
order to avoid voting for the candidate of the old regime. This would challenge the 
notion of free and fair elections which would ultimately question whether this was a 
true democratic practice. The Supreme Constitutional Court would also rule that the 
Shura Council be disbanded when the new parliament was elected, but this was 
ultimately disrupted with the 30th of June Revolution.  
 When looking at the role of the Muslim Brotherhood during the transitional 
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phase in the build-up to the 30th of June it becomes evident that while they tried to 
maintain the image of a moderate democratic group they failed when it came to 
practice which forced people to return to the streets to demand the fall of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and its party from power. This would indicate that while the group may 
have possibly been elected democratically elected, albeit through questionable means, 
it still did not meet the promises that it made the people when Mohamed Morsi was 
elected. In addition to not meeting the needs of the people, it also proved that it 
employed measures that have been used by the previous regime to consolidate power 
and to exclude the opposition. 
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Chapter 5: The Muslim Brotherhood and the 30th of June Revolution 
5.1: Failures of the Muslim Brotherhood and the road to June 30th Revolution 
 The 30th of June Revolution started through a petition by a group of youth who 
saw that the state was being controlled not by President Morsi, who advocated in his 
campaign that he would be a president to all Egyptians, but was being controlled by 
the Muslim Brotherhood. This stance is reminiscent of the tactics that were used by 
Mubarak’s regime in order to control the state. The Mubarak regime and the NDP was 
the only group which was benefiting from the state while the rest of the population 
was kept out of power. The situation under President Morsi was quite similar where 
he isolated the youth along and even though he was democratically elected he was 
making mistakes in state building which delegitimize his rule and eventually led to his 
downfall in the 3rd of July 2013. 
 The first aspect which led to the downfall of the Muslim Brotherhood would 
be the exclusion of the other political players in the scene in Egypt. While the Muslim 
Brotherhood first advocated that it would be moderate in terms of its aspirations to 
power yet the opposition was shocked to see what Samuel Tadros explains as “the 
Brotherhood abandon[ing] any perceived moderation and moved in a clearly 
authoritarian direction” (Tadros, 2013). This was the beginning of the opposition 
realizing that the democratically elected government was moving towards 
consolidating its power to ensure that it stays in power. The first instance that the 
Muslim Brotherhood was moving to consolidate its power is the assembly it selected 
in order to formulate the constitution. The formation of the government was criticized 
that the FJP excluded the opposition and instead further consolidated their power. The 
Muslim Brotherhood would point out to statistics and say that they are not taking 
over, but while they may have not taken the majority in terms of numbers they 
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awarded themselves key ministerial positions (Wickham). President Morsi would also 
award supporters key positions such as the governor’s position. In the last selection he 
gave seven positions to members of the Muslim Brotherhood one to the Gama al 
Islamiya and the rest to military men (Wickham). This tactic was also used by 
Mubarak to further gain support through patronage. In this example the award is a 
form of key positions.  
 The formulation of the constitutional assembly gave the first impression that 
the Muslim Brotherhood was seeking more than a simply moderate role in the new 
Egyptian politics. The first task after the 2011 Revolution was to create a new 
constitution which would be aimed at representing Egyptians everywhere. The way 
the constituent assembly was to be formed was through the parliament in which the 
members of the parliament voted on the members which would make up the 100 
person assembly (Wickham). This immediately sparked fears in the opposition for the 
representation of minorities and women. And these fears were actually substantial. 
Upon the election of the constituent assembly the one factor that became very obvious 
of the committee of 100 is the 66 Islamist thinkers which were included in them. This 
automatically gave the Islamists who had banded together on common grounds such 
as the role of religion in politics an advantage. The Islamists were given the majority 
and the final 34 seats to all of the Copts and liberal parties. The women which were 
given seats were Islamists; this was a way the Freedom and Justice Party could take 
over more seats. This goes against the Muslim Brotherhood’s comments about how 
they intent to be inclusive. It can be seen as an attempt by the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
FJP who control a large portion of the parliament to control the long term future of the 
country. The constitution which is meant to set the building blocks of the structure of 
the state is very important for the future of Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood by having 
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a majority of the seats in the constituent assembly would be able to have a larger stake 
in the structure of the state which would further empower them. This tactic violates 
the notions of democracy and inclusion and is very reminiscent of the control the 
NDP had over decisions regarding the state. This assembly was ultimately disbanded 
by the Supreme Constitutional Court which was considered a success for the liberals, 
women and minorities.  
 The parliament was now faced with the task of formulating a second 
constituent assembly to form the constitution. The legislative assembly of the 
parliament issues the constituent assembly law which stipulates that the assembly 
would be comprised of 100 people, but unlike the previous assembly only 39 
members would be from the parliament. While this was considered a new change and 
the possibility for reform was considered possible. But as the assembly proceeded 
with writing the constitutions people began withdrawing from the assembly on the 
grounds that the still Islamist dominated assembly was excluding the opposition. By 
the time it had completed drafting the constitution the assembly “there was not a 
single Christian and only four women, all Islamists. Many of the men wore beards, 
the hallmark of Muslim conservatives” (Hendawi). The assembly which was 
dominated by Islamists by the end of its sessions still proceeded with the drafting of 
the constitution and finished voting on it 16 hours (Hussein). The constitution when 
put up for referendum for the people with “ with about a 30% turnout in which it 
garnered only 63%– i.e. only a fifth of the country voted for it” (Hendawi). Due to the 
judges being on strike there was no monitoring for this process which ultimately 
meant that this election did not meet international regulation (Hendawi). The fact that 
this constitution was made with little consensus and lack of participation 
delegitimizes the whole process which does not reflect how a democracy should 
Al Khalifa  84 
function. In an article in the Guardian, Elijah Zarwan, a Cairo-based fellow at the 
European Council for Foreign Relations comments on the constitution saying that: 
 "the Muslim Brotherhood can succeed in passing this constitution despite the 
opposition but in so doing they are likely to poison the country's political 
atmosphere for years to come and my assumption is that the constitution, if 
passed, will not survive beyond Brotherhood rule," (Hussein). 
 
 This process of drafting the constitution reflects on two different segments of 
the political scene in Egypt. The first of which being the Muslim Brotherhood who 
had a large say in the formation of this new constitution and effectively drove the 
opposition out of the decision making process despite “its promises of being an 
inclusive organization, [observers] had expected the Brotherhood to reach out to its 
opponents and attempt to build a national consensus to sail the turbulent waters into 
which Egypt was heading” (Tadros 2013). The second segment that this reflects on is 
opposition who are still weak in relation to the Muslim Brotherhood and their political 
wing the Freedom and Justice Party. This internal conflict has in effect resulted in the 
poor application of democracy. The elected majority did not enforce it by seeking 
negotiations with the opposition, instead isolating the opposition and seeking the 
authoritarian method by enforcing their own way. This relationship between the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the opposition helps show that a democratically elected 
group with does not necessarily result with a democratic process. The resulting 
constitution further showed how the Muslim Brotherhood was not inclusive in the 
drafting of this constitution. Upon looking through the constitution it becomes evident 
that there were many articles which had implications of an authoritarian state. Article 
10 stipulates that “The State is keen to preserve the genuine character of the Egyptian 
family, its cohesion and stability, and to protect its moral values, all as regulated by 
law” (Controversial Articles). The implications of this article extend to endangering 
the personal freedom of the individual in the name of “protecting moral values.” This 
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part of the article grants the state the ability to judge the moral values of the 
individual as well as do what is necessary as deemed by the state in order to safeguard 
said moral values. Another article which can have the consequence of an authoritarian 
regime is article 4 which states that:  
“Al-Azhar is an encompassing independent Islamic institution, with exclusive 
autonomy over its own affairs, responsible for preaching Islam, theology and 
the Arabic language in Egypt and the world. Al-Azhar Senior Scholars are to be 
consulted in matters pertaining to Islamic law” (Controversial articles). 
 
Many had criticized this article because it gave al-Azhar unprecedented control over 
the interpretation of Shariah and this created fears that this article may “lead to 
complications in the future, due to fears that future leadership may use the new 
authority to mandate repressive laws” (Controversial articles). 
 In the weeks after the election of Mohamed Morsi he was always referred to 
as the first democratically elected president, a point which is contested previously in 
this study. Weeks after his election President Morsi issued a constitutional declaration 
which was considered disastrous and was considered a breach of democracy. The 
declaration was released in light of there being a threat that the second constitute 
assembly being disbanded. This declaration included seven articles. The second 
article stipulated that: 
“Previous constitutional declarations, laws, and decrees made by the president 
since he took office on 30 June 2012, until the constitution is approved and a 
new People’s Assembly [lower house of parliament] is elected, are final and 
binding and cannot be appealed by any way or to any entity. Nor shall they be 
suspended or cancelled and all lawsuits related to them and brought before any 
judicial body against these decisions are annulled” (English text).  
 
 The second article of the constitutional declaration can only be described as 
authoritarian because it places the president and his decisions before those of the 
judiciary and makes all of his decisions immune. This gives the president 
unprecedented powers, a notion that is not accepted by a democracy. The second 
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article of the constitutional declaration was met with great outrage by activists 
because it gave the president unlimited power without the judicial body to place a 
limit on these powers. Amr Hamzawy commented saying that “Egypt is facing a 
horrifying coup against legitimacy and the rule of law and a complete assassination of 
the democratic transition” (Kirkpatric). This article represents the value of the rule of 
law to the regime. Through this declaration President Morsi has placed himself above 
the law. Another article that also increased the power of the president is article 5 
which stipulates that “No judicial body can dissolve the Shura Council [upper house 
of parliament] or the Constituent Assembly” (English text). This article can be seen in 
light of the disbanding of the previous constituent assembly. With the Muslim 
Brotherhood wanting to increase its power and essentially lay the building blocks for 
the future to ensure that its power becomes uninterrupted by judicial power an article 
such as article 5 would essentially give it free reign to act within the constituent 
assembly without caring that there would be judicial repercussions or the threat of 
disbanding the assembly. This article also represents the president increasing his 
power and consolidating it on behalf of the goals of the Muslim Brotherhood.  
 Article three can also be interpreted by as a way to further consolidate power 
and shows how the state was moving back towards an authoritarian system. Article 3 
of the declaration states that: 
“The prosecutor-general is to be appointed from among the members of the 
judiciary by the President of the Republic for a period of four years 
commencing from the date of office and is subject to the general conditions of 
being appointed as a judge and should not be under the age of 40. This 
provision applies to the one currently holding the position with immediate 
effect.” (English text). 
 
This article of the declaration can be interpreted as a method by the Freedom and 
Justice Party to place someone it can trust in a position which supposed to be neutral. 
This caused further problems with the judiciary which had already protested that 
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Morsi was consolidating power and was rising over the judiciary. The most important 
article in the constitutional declaration is Article 6. Article 6 in the constitutional 
declaration stipulates that “The President may take the necessary actions and 
measures to protect the country and the goals of the revolution” (English text). This 
grants the president to do whatever is necessary in the name of safeguarding the 
“goals of the revolution”. Open ended terms such as these are commonly used by 
authoritarian rulers in order to be able to act in whatever fashion they want without 
any legal provisions which would ultimately tip the balance of the Muslim 
Brotherhood controlled president. This article is similar to a tactic which was used by 
previous regimes which is the state of emergency. The state of emergency allowed 
Mubarak to control the state in the name of national security and allowed him to do 
whatever is necessary to maintain “national security”. In this example President Morsi 
has granted himself power to do whatever is necessary to “protect the goals of the 
revolution.” Scholar Nathan Brown explains this constitutional declaration when he 
comments on the message being “I, Morsi, am all powerful. And in my first act as 
being all powerful, I declare myself more powerful still. But don’t worry — it’s just 
for a little while” (Kirkpatrick). The differences between the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
Freedom and Justice Party tactics and the National Democratic Party are not 
completely different. Both have sought to consolidate their power using legal means 
in the same of safeguarding the state. President Morsi would also come in direct clash 
with the Supreme Constitutional Court when he would call upon the already 
disbanded People’s Assembly. This was seen by activists as an act to bring back the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist dominated parliament to aid the president in 
passing laws quicker. This action to bring back the parliament in addition to the 
constitutional declaration put Morsi in conflict with the judiciary and eventually 
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causing them to hold strikes in protests to his actions. When he assumed power 
President Morsi also changed the age of retirement of judges from 70 to 60 years of 
age, this would have effectively caused a fourth of the judges to go on retirement, 
allowing Morsi to place more Muslim Brotherhood members in the judiciary to 
ensure that he would have more support (Hussein).  This unlimited access and seeking 
of control on behalf of President Morsi shows that even though leaders or groups can 
be democratically elected it does not necessarily equate with a democracy because 
democracy is a process not simply elections only.  
 
5.2: Nahda Project 
 The shortcomings of the Muslim Brotherhood in state building extends past 
simply constitutions and laws in order to further consolidate their power it is also seen 
in the promises that the Muslim Brotherhood gave. With the election of the Freedom 
and Justice Party the Muslim Brotherhood were finally given the opportunity to apply 
their solution to what they saw is wrong with society and what they have been 
planning for the past 80 years since its creation and it would be held accountable for 
these promises. Khairat El Shater describes this program as “‘the result of a 
tremendous effort and hard work that lasted well over fifteen years’ and that it was 
supported by the ‘talents and experience of more than 80 years.’  If implemented, the 
project would uplift Egypt in four years” (Tadros 2013). After a revolution which 
caused people to have high expectations the burden fell on the shoulders of the 
Muslim Brotherhood to make these promises happen. The Muslim Brotherhood 
advocated for their Nahda Project. According to El-Shater, it: 
 “started with building a democratic system and strong political 
institutions,… women had a role in it, the Freedom and Justice Party’s Women 
Committee added; it ‘aimed primarily at the elimination of poverty and 
unemployment,’ Ali Fateh al Bab declared; and there was even a ‘Nahda-based 
Al Khalifa  89 
education campaign,’ a press conference announced. Sinai was the priority of 
the Nahda project, Presidential candidate Morsi promised; one week later it was 
tourism that was the declared priority of the project; finally the project was 
‘based on empowering the people and placing their destinies in their own 
hands.’ (Tadros 2013) 
 
 This Nahda project seemed the accumulation of years of political experience as well 
as ideological reform, but upon inspection of the Nahda Project it becomes obvious 
that it was meant as rhetoric as opposed to being made up of actual substance and 
when it came time for the President Morsi to apply the Nahda Project people did not 
feel any tangible effects on the ground (Tadros, 2013). When it came time to discuss 
the ways to solve problems such as social justice or education reform, the members of 
the parliament discussed issues such as personal status laws this caused people to turn 
greatly against the Muslim Brotherhood.  
5.3: 30th of June Revolution 
 By the end of the first year under the rule of Mohamed Morsi and what the 
people felt was an increasing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, a grassroots 
movement started called Tamarod. This movement would successfully organize the 
protests of the 30th of June which would cause the military to intervene and oust 
Morsi. The unpopularity of the performance of Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim 
Brotherhood can be seen in a poll taken by Gallup it is evident that the Freedom and 
Justice Party had lost large portion of its support. 
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Source: Gallup  
 In this graph it becomes clear that the performance of the Freedom and Justice 
Party has been steadily declining. The steady decline of supporters is what caused the 
success of the 30th of June Revolution. What the two years under the influence of the 
Muslim Brotherhood ruling accomplished is costing it a lot of its support from within 
its own group. The Muslim Brotherhood as a result was discredited and their plan had 
failed. The Muslim Brotherhood had no experience in governing and had in fact 
become very increasingly similar to Mubarak’s NDP. The problem with the Muslim 
Brotherhood can be seen as the lack of experience that while they did in fact run for 
parliament and control syndicates this is hardly similar to governing a country the size 
of Egypt. What made matters even more difficult is that their over ambition led them 
to take on more responsibilities than they can handle and eventually fail because of 
their inability to meet the high expectations of the people which they untimely placed 
with their rhetoric. Their role as the strongest and most organized opposition became 
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a detriment because there were no organizations, save the remnants of the old regime, 
to match their ambition and ability which made them the only viable option for 
governing in a scene where there were no political opposition to in effect cause them 
to evolve in order to be elected again.  
 During the political crisis leading up to the events which occurred on the 30th 
of June it became apparent that the ultimatum that the military issued to all the 
political parties to resolve the crisis would not be met. President Morsi like Mubarak 
before him appeared on national television and remained defiant which is an 
indication that he may have not been aware of the magnitude of opposition to his rule. 
The actions of the presidency and the FJP during the build-up to the revolution shows 
several weaknesses on the part of the Muslim Brotherhood such as their inability to 
negotiate and compromise with members of the opposition a skill that is essential in 
the creation of a democracy. This is a weakness that comes from the internal 
characteristic of the Muslim Brotherhood. The strength of their structure and the 
importance of loyalty within the group make it difficult for members to trust outside 
their group. This made the FJP unable to reach a common ground with the opposition 
in order to possibly avoid this. This lack of trust existed on both ends of the crisis; 
both groups the Muslim Brotherhood and their opposition could no longer trust each 
other or their word. On the part of the opposition this comes from the multitude of 
promises that the FJP made to be inclusive only to ignore the opposition and take 
action on their own. After the events of the 30th of June the Freedom and Justice Party 
remained defiant and challenged the military’s ouster of the president. When asked 
about the events members of the Muslim Brotherhood and Freedom and Justice Party 
are quick to blame the military and the opposition and claim that they have legitimacy 
because of the ballot box. While the ballot box is important in developing a 
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democracy, the Muslim Brotherhood was in fact placing regulations that would have 
brought back an authoritarian system. When questioned about their own actions, they 
are: 
 “wilfully ignoring the fact that a moment of widespread and popular outrage did 
occur on June 30—not to mention the posing of legitimate questions regarding certain 
government departments and economic and financial matters—as a result of their 
disastrous mistakes in managing public and political affairs throughout Morsi’s year 
in power.” (Hamzawy) 
 
The Muslim Brotherhood has been staging marches and demonstrations which 
while they claim are peaceful usually end in deadly clashes between citizens and the 
Muslim Brotherhood. This is an indicator that the Muslim Brotherhood is not facing 
opposition from the security forces, but is in fact being faced by the rising opposition 
from people. The issue of violence is important because it is untimely causing the 
Muslim Brotherhood to lose support on the streets. The Muslim Brotherhood’s 
rhetoric has been violent and hate filled as explained by Amr Hamzawy as speeches 
given in a “highly aggressive manner, they accuse of treason anyone who opposes, on 
the basis of democracy, the intervention of the army in politics or anyone who refuses 
to be silent about human rights violations” (Hamzawy). What this speech is creating 
is further polarization of the state because it creates a “we they” mentality in the 
streets of Egypt and the speeches are aimed at portraying everyone against the 
Muslim Brotherhood are traitors of the country.  The Freedom and Justice Party 
refuses to acknowledge that they should find a common ground with the new regime. 
The actions of the Freedom and Justice Party show that elections do not necessarily 
indicate democracy. Achieving a democracy is contingent on many factors such as 
ensuring that the ruler does not consolidate power and maintaining good relations 
with the opposition in order to further the democratic process, all these factors were 
not adopted by the Freedom and Justice Party. 
Al Khalifa  93 
 
5.4: Muslim Brotherhood and the future 
 There are a lot of questions regarding the fact of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
the political scene in Egypt. Since the ouster and subsequent sit in  Rab’a El Adaweya 
Square it has become evident that the Muslim Brotherhood is undergoing a period of 
change with members from within the group deciding to accept the 30th of June reality 
and start working again. These groups acknowledge many of the problems with the 
Muslim Brotherhood come from a result of the older generations being the ones who 
are in control of all the decisions and with the structure of loyalty within the group it 
is very difficult to break off. The youth within the organization though are undergoing 
this change and have in fact broken off from the larger group. The group, 
“Brotherhood without Violence” defines “themselves as reformist, calling for the 
withdrawal of confidence from the Supreme Guide Mohammad Badie and electing 
new Guidance Bureau members, according to the movement’s coordinator Ahmad 
Yahya.” (Sharaf). This group was created by the youth which further shows how the 
generational divide within the group can lead to reformations which despite the 
increasing opposition to the group’s violence and hate filled speech some may be able 
to salvage the ideology in the fact of the public opinion.  
Conclusion 
 The Muslim Brotherhood played a role in the rise of the 2011 Revolution and 
was seen as the most organized opposition group on the political scene and this was 
translated in the electoral votes seen in the parliamentary elections and once again 
when the president of its political wing Dr. Mohamed Morsi won the elections. When 
looking at the Muslim Brotherhood in its role in the 2011 Revolution it is important to 
understand its evolution. The Muslim Brotherhood was created in 1928 by school 
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teacher Hassan al-Banna who saw that the moral problems in the Egyptian society 
needed to be resolved through strict application of Islam. He saw that amongst the 
reasons behind these moral problems was British colonialism. Al-Banna started by 
preaching to people about ways to become a better Muslim and through social 
outreach programs he was able to create a highly intricate group with hundreds of 
thousands of supporters and an increasing number of sympathizers. The ideology of 
the group was very simple and appealed to a wide mass of people especially those 
who were disenfranchised by the government. The slogan Islam is the answer was 
very popular and was relatable to many and offered the promises of a social welfare 
state. The strong structure of the group enabled them to maintain close ties and was 
able to have them mobilize for protests in favour of the application of Shariah. Al-
Banna initially advocated for gradual reform but many began to get impatient. The 
participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in politics starts under the colonial era where 
they would protest for Shariah. The colonial era was also a dark period for the 
Muslim Brotherhood as they formed the Secret Apparatus. This apparatus would put 
the group against the state and eventually lead to the assassination of Prime Minister 
Nahas. The group would be banned but would still participate in politics through 
demonstrations. This era would gain the Muslim Brotherhood many sympathizers and 
more followers. The Muslim Brotherhood would be very popular by the end of the era 
and would become the image of opposition to colonial rule. 
 The Muslim Brotherhood would participate with the Free Officers in the 1952 
Revolution through gaining Nasser the support they needed in through their ability to 
mobilize their supporters. After Nasser assumed power the relationship between the 
regime and the Muslim Brotherhood would be good until an attempted assassination 
would give Nasser the reason needed to take the Muslim Brotherhood out of the 
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scene. He would imprison many of their members and cause many to flee which 
created the global Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood would suffer 
greatly under the rule of Nasser and would continue to try to protest against him, but 
he eventually, due to his charismatic nature would win the popular support he needed 
to stay in power.  
 During the reign of Sadat the Muslim Brotherhood are released from jail as a 
tactic by Sadat to counter act the socialists. Under the regain of Sadat and with Omar 
al-Tilmisani as the General Guide the Muslim Brotherhood would be able to reclaim 
some of its former glory and would renounce violence. While the group was tolerated 
but was still not allowed to apply for a party and would still be subject of crackdowns 
by the regime. Despite the Muslim Brotherhood still adapting the gradual 
transformation tactic and would accept to run in some elections for the parliament 
some would follow the more radical ideology of Sayid Qutb and break off and 
eventually assassinate Sadat.  
 The Muslim Brotherhood under the era of Mubarak would contribute greatly 
to the development of the Muslim Brotherhood and shape them as the political entity 
which would take the lead in the 2011 Revolution. In these three decades the Muslim 
Brotherhood would be functioning under the state of emergency and would still be 
successful and thrive. The Muslim Brotherhood would begin to gradually take over 
the political scene through the use of the syndicate elections to gradually participate in 
politics. This would be the beginning of seeing the Muslim Brotherhood engaging in a 
democratic process. They would also compete in parliamentary elections and would 
win seats as independents, but the regime would untimely be threatened by their 
popularity and further impose legal obstacles to prevent them from gaining more 
power. All these eras helped develop the Muslim Brotherhood into the entity that 
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participated in the 2011 Revolution. Through these eras they gain experiences such as 
how to make alliances in order to gain seats with through party lists. The group would 
also gain the image of the opposition while gaining the experience and the grassroots 
support that would turn it into the most organized opposition. The most important 
development the group would undergo was the ideological transformations. With the 
constant evolution of the group it would adopt certain notions in its platforms such as 
democracy and human rights which would gain it popularity during the authoritarian 
era of Mubarak. The Muslim Brotherhood would also increase its popularity through 
increasing its social outreach programs and eventually further threaten the state by 
occupying the areas where the state ignored. 
 During the 2011 Revolution the Muslim Brotherhood conservatives would 
first be hesitant to participate fearing repercussions from the regime should the 
uprisings fail. The youth would then eagerly participate and then when the movement 
looked to be a success the rest of the Brotherhood’s supporters and members would 
participate. After the fall of the Mubarak regime the country would undergo its first 
free and fair elections. The Muslim Brotherhood would create its first political party 
the Freedom and Justice Party and would compete in the parliament. The Muslim 
Brotherhood would use its Freedom and Justice Party in order to apply its goals in 
society and eventually establish its version of a state. The Brotherhood would do very 
well in elections and would win a 47% stake in the parliament and with the addition 
of the Safali Al-Nour Party which shares some common grounds with the Muslim 
Brotherhood the political Islam movement would dominate the parliament. The 
secularists, liberals and revolutionaries would criticize the parliament as not 
representative of Egypt. The supporters of the parliament would respond that this was 
the result of free and fair elections. This study first contests that notion on the grounds 
Al Khalifa  97 
that the elections while they may have been free, but they were not fair. The success 
of the Islamists would be because of their financial backing as well as their ability to 
mobilize and in combination with the weakness of the opposition the Islamists would 
win the majority of the parliament. This study then goes on to argue that a 
democratically elected government does not necessarily mean that it would be 
employing the maintenance of a democracy or that it would be doing what is best for 
the people. 
 This study argues this thesis through the use of the actions of the 
democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood, do not reflect that of a party which 
intends to help further democracy in Egypt but instead intends to employ authoritarian 
methods which were ironically employed by the NDP in order to repress and control 
the Muslim Brotherhood. Such examples include the formation of a constitute 
assembly which was made predominantly of Islamists and without the incorporation 
of liberals, women or Copts. When the Supreme Constitutional Court would disband 
the assembly they would create a new one and even with the first one failed they 
would also create a predominantly Islamist assembly and most of the liberals, Copts 
and women withdrew. This constitution would also include articles which would 
threaten the basic rights and freedoms of the individual and would pass despite the 
judges not overseeing the referendum and therefore not meet international regulations. 
When the President of the Freedom and Justice Party, Mohamed Morsi was elected he 
would advocate himself as the president of all Egyptians, yet despite that he would 
make many decisions favouring his own party and supporters such as giving his party 
and supporters key ministerial and governmental positions, a tactic which considered 
patronage. Other examples include his presidential declaration which is seen as an 
attempt to further consolidate his power in a very authoritarian way. All these 
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examples help support this study’s argument that even though the Muslim 
Brotherhood has had experience as the victim of oppression by authoritarian leaders 
and even though its ideology claims to value participation not domination it still tried 
to consolidate power and employed many of the same tactics to isolate the opposition 
as the NDP. When the military moved to oust President Morsi after three days of 
protests by millions of Egyptians, many would argue that this was a coup and the end 
of democracy in Egypt, but upon looking at the practices of the Muslim Brotherhood 
it becomes apparent that the group was laying the building blocks of an authoritarian 
rule. The evidence helps show that democracy is more than a ballot box, it’s a 
continuous process which the Muslim Brotherhood were stopping through highly 
undemocratic tactics which shows that a democratically elected does not necessarily 
mean the implementation of democracy.  
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